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CHAPTER 7 
VIETNAM’S FISCAL HISTORY AND DECENTRALISATION 
FROM 1976 TO 2007 
 
7.1  Introduction 
 
Vietnam is a developing country in the South-East Asian region with per capita 
income of US$ 750 in 2007 and a public sector that represents about one quarter of the 
national economy. The country has faced many challenges in the process of economic 
growth as a fully independent nation since liberation on 30 April 1975 and the 
proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on 25 April 1976. The Vietnamese 
economy was thoroughly run down after 30 years of war with two completely different 
economic systems: the North with the highly centralised and planned regime and the 
South with the market regime. In the years since unification, Vietnam has attempted to 
integrate itself further with the world economy.  
  
  This chapter aims to explore the fiscal history and fiscal decentralisation in 
Vietnam since the national unification in 1975 using concepts derived from the 
fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation developed in Chapter 3. This analysis, 
together with the investigation of fiscal decentralisation in China and selected ASEAN 
countries in Chapter 8, provides the context from which future policy on fiscal reforms 
are drawn for Vietnam in Chapter 9 of this study. 
 
Following this introduction, the history of Vietnam is briefly discussed in Section 
7.2. The current structure of the Vietnamese government is discussed in Section 7.3, and 
raises some concerns for fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam in the future. Changes in the 
fiscal environment since 1976 are discussed in Section 7.4, which also outlines 
significant changes in the allocations of revenue sources between the national 
government and subnational governments (“SNGs”) in Vietnam after the 1990 fiscal 
reform. Section 7.5 comments on the current general state of fiscal decentralisation in 
Vietnam with the focus on the analyses of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of  146
SNGs in Vietnam. The fiscal decentralisation index is also measured. Concluding 
remarks are in Section 7.6.   
  
7.2  Brief overview of the history of Vietnam 
 
Some recent archaeological excavations have proved that the presence of human 
beings in Vietnam lasted for a long period in the Old Stone Age (300,000–500,000 years) 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam, 2003, p.18). Vietnam’s history has reflected 
many political, social and economic transformations. However, until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the single defining historical feature was the successive sequence of feudal 
dynasties. Some of the most important ones are the Ly Dynasty (11
th and 12
th centuries), 
the Tran Dynasty (13
th and 14




centuries). And, in all the feudal dynasties, highly centralised administrative structures 
were prominent. However, this long historical tradition was fundamentally changed in 
1858 when France colonised Vietnam following the first attack on Danang (the present-
day central part of Vietnam).  Nguyen Ai Quoc, later known as President Ho Chi Minh, 
travelled abroad in 1911 to find ways of opposing French colonisation.  
 
On 2 September 1945, Democratic Republic of Vietnam was established. In the 
same year, the French colonialists invaded the country again. The nine years of war 
between 1945 and 1954 ended with the defeat of the French in the battle of Dien Bien 
Phu. The resulting Geneva Agreement on Vietnam was signed between France and 
Vietnam in 1954. Under this agreement, the country was temporarily partitioned into two 
parts (North Vietnam and South Vietnam) at the seventeenth parallel with the intention of 
reunifying these parts within two years (in 1956) by means of a general election held all 
over Vietnam. However, this did not eventuate and the country remained divided. North 
Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) with its capital Hanoi came under the 
control of Vietnam’s Worker Party. The Southern part of Vietnam (The Republic of 
Vietnam) came under the control of a pro-French administration, and later, a pro-
American administration with its capital in Saigon. National reunification and 
independence were realised on 30 April 1975. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam was  147
subsequently formed on 25 April 1976, with the remainder of the 20
th century being 
largely devoted to developing the economy.   
 
7.3  Current structure of the government in Vietnam 
 
The current structure of the government (including both national and subnational 
governments) is summarised in Figure 7.1 below. 
FIGURE 7.1 
THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE VIETNAMESE STATE 
 
 
Source: The 1992 Vietnam Constitution. 
 
Today, Vietnam is governed by the Vietnamese Communist Party. The present 
structure of the government system in Vietnam is defined by the 1992 Vietnam 
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otherwise stated, in the discussion that follows, all references to “articles” are to specific 
articles in the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam. 
 
Federal nations like Australia and The United States typically have three distinct 
levels of government (namely, federal, state and local governments) while unitary 
countries often have just two broad levels: national and subnational governments. 
Vietnam is a unitary country, and, as such, has two main separate levels of government. 
At the subnational government level, also generally termed “local government” (1992 
Vietnam Constitution), there are three distinct strata of government: the province strata, 
district strata and commune strata. All these strata are constitutionally regulated. The 
structure within the two levels of government in Vietnam is quite similar in some senses. 
 
7.3.1  The national government 
 
The National Assembly is defined in the 1992 Constitution of Vietnam as “the 
highest representative organ of the people, the highest organ of the nation’s power of the 
Socialist Republic of Vietnam” (Article 83). In addition, the National Assembly is the 
only political entity which has the authority to alter the Constitution and set legislative 
laws (Article 84). It determines basic domestic and foreign policies, social security, and 
national defence and security. It also sets the major principles that govern the nation’s 
machinery, the social relations and activities of the citizens. The term of the National 
Assembly is five years and it has two meetings annually. However, in special 
circumstances, the President, the Prime Minister or at least one-third of all members of 
the Assembly can petition the Standing Committee of the National Assembly to convene 
an extraordinary session (Article 86). The Standing Committee is the permanent and 
ongoing administrative body that operates between the two sessions of the National 
Assembly, with a number of members of the Committee decided by the National 
Assembly. Members of the Standing Committee cannot be members of the government 
(Article 90). Its typical rights are the supervision and control over the implementation of 
constitution, laws, resolutions of the National Assembly; Resolutions and Ordinances of 
the Standing Committee; supervision over the activities of the government, the Supreme  149
People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuracy; and supervision and provision of 
guidelines to activities of People’s Councils.  
 
The President of Vietnam is the nation’s Head of State. He or she (though no 
woman has yet been President) represents the nation at internal functions and in matters 
of foreign affairs. The President is elected by the members of the National Assembly 
(Articles 101 and 102). The typical rights of this position include: (i) promulgating the 
Constitution, laws and resolutions; (ii) submitting proposals to the National Assembly to 
elect or dismiss the Vice-president of Vietnam, the Prime Minister, the Tribunal President 
of the Supreme People’s Court, the Head of the Supreme People’s Procuracy; and to 
appoint, or to sack: the Deputy Prime Ministers, and Ministers and other members of the 
Government based on the Resolution of the National Assembly or its Standing 
Committee (Article 103). In addition, the President has the right to attend meetings held 
by the Standing Committee of the National Assembly and, if needed, attend meetings 
held by the government (Article 105). 
 
The government is referred to in 1992 Vietnam’s Constitution as the “executive 
organ of the National Assembly, the highest organ of nation’s administration” of the 
country (Article 109). It controls the implementation of political, economic, cultural and 
social duties, defence, security and foreign affairs of the nation (Article 109). In addition, 
the government is accountable to the National Assembly and is required to report to the 
National Assembly, the Standing Committee of National Assembly and the President. 
Other than the Prime Minister, members of the government are not necessarily members 
of the National Assembly (Article 110). The Prime Minister is proposed by the President 
and elected and dismissed by the National Assembly with a five-year term. In addition, 
laws pertaining to the organisation of political activities regulate the organisational 
structure of the government which consists of ministries and organs at ministerial level. 
The National Assembly decides whether to establish ministries and public institutions 
based on recommendations from the Prime Minister. Vietnam currently has many 
ministries and public bodies that function at ministerial level. Some of them are the 
Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Planning and Investment, and the State Bank.  150
 
The Supreme People’s Court is the highest judicial body in Vietnam with its 
members having five-year terms of office as the National Assembly (Articles 128 and 
134). The Tribunal President of the Court, proposed by the President and elected or 
dismissed by the National Assembly, is responsible for reporting to the National 
Assembly, or its Standing Committee, and the President when the National Assembly is 
not in session. The Vice-tribunal President and judges are proposed by the Tribunal 
President and appointed or sacked by the President (Article 103).  
 
The Supreme People’s Procuracy supervises compliance with the law, as 
established by ministries, ministerial bodies, local administrative bodies, economic 
organisations, social organisations, and the people’s armed forces. The Supreme People’s 
Procuracy exercises the right of prosecution, ensures the strict and united implementation 
of the law (Article 137). The Head, with the five-year tenure, is responsible for reporting 
to the National Assembly or to the Standing Committee of National Assembly and the 
President when the National Assembly is not in session (Articles 138 and 139). The Head 
of the Procuracy is proposed by the President and elected or sacked by the National 
Assembly. The Deputy Heads, procurators and investigators are proposed by the Head 
and appointed or sacked by the President (Article 103).   
      
7.3.2  Subnational governments 
 
As a populous country of more than 83 million people in 2007, subnational 
governments have played a very important role in the economic, social and cultural 
development of the nation. The administrative structure of the country at subnational 
authority level is organised into three different sub-levels: province, district and 
commune. There are currently 64 provinces, in which five large cities are granted a 
provincial status: Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, Da Nang and Can Tho. These 
provinces are divided into 611 districts which are, in turn, subdivided into 10,602 
communes (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004). At every level of SNGs, the legislative authority 
of the government resides in the People’s Council and executive authority resides in the  151
People’s Committee, whose members are appointed by the People’s Council for the same 
level of government. Although the People’s Council and the People’s Committee are set 
up as two distinct bodies under the law, in practice, their membership is usually 
overlapping (i.e. some members at People’s Council are also members at People’s 
Committee, except for some positions). 
 
The People’s Council represents “the will, aspiration and right of the local 
citizens” and is elected by the people (Article 119). The People’s Council is accountable 
to the local inhabitants and higher bodies of the government. The structure of the 
People’s Council at SNGs’ level is also divided into three different levels – provinces, 
districts, and communes. Representatives of the People’s Committee are elected by the 
People’s Council for the corresponding level of government. The structure of the 
Committee is in accordance with the Council. It means that there are Committees at 
province, district and commune level. Furthermore, the structure of the local People’s 
Court includes: the People’s Court of Provinces; and the People’s Court of Districts. The 
same principle of the local People’s Court, the structure of the local People’s Procuracy is 
set up in two different tiers: provinces and districts. There is no local People’s Court and 
People’s Procuracy at the lowest administrative level of SNGs - the commune level. 
 
7.3.3  The structure of governments: current issues 
 
The discussions in Sections 7.3.1 and 7.3.2 reveal a significant and fundamental 
issue with the vertical structure of government in Vietnam. Current practices in Vietnam 
show that each stratum of SNGs is closely supervised by many higher administrative 
levels. As such, local budgets need to get approval from both the local People’s Council 
at the same level, and then from the People’s Committee at the next higher level. 
Furthermore, the consolidated budget of the entire SNGs (or provinces) must be approved 
by the national government (Ministry of Finance) and then by the highest legislative 
body, the National Assembly. This long process seriously constrains the fiscal autonomy 
of SNGs in Vietnam. Discussions of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam in the previous 
studies, which point to an improvement in fiscal decentralisation due to the greater fiscal  152
role of SNGs, such as Martinez-Vazquez (2004), focus mainly on the fiscal importance of 
SNGs. Fiscal autonomy of SNGs in Vietnam is not, typically, presented as a reason for 
increased fiscal decentralisation. 
    
7.4  Changes in economic plans since 1976 
 
Changes in economic progress and fiscal arrangements in Vietnam can be 
reviewed as a sequence of five-year (and later, ten-year) periods. In part, this is because 
the Government of Vietnam initially prepared and implemented successive “Five-Year 
Socio-economic Development Plans” from 1976 to 1990 and then “Ten-Year Plans” from 
1990. The economic plans and outcomes relative to each five-year plan are briefly 
discussed to provide the economic planning context within which fiscal arrangements in 
Vietnam were established. 
 
Period from 1976 to 1980 
Immediately after the war, much of Vietnam was in ruins. Reunification 
commenced with the introduction of the Five-Year Plan from 1976 to 1980. The broad 
objectives of this plan were: (i) to transform the economy from small-scale to large-scale 
production; and (ii) to develop heavy industry (such as engineering, energy, metallurgy 
and chemistry) and agriculture (Vo, 1990). National income, agriculture, and industrial 
production were planned to increase by 14, 10, and 18 per cent per annum, respectively 
(De Vylder and Fforde, 1988, p.167).   
 
However, many of the targets of this plan were not realised. GDP increased by 
only 0.4 percent per annum, whereas the population rate increased to around 2.3 percent 
annually, and in conjunction with a 20 percent annual increase in the price level (Ministry 
of Finance of Vietnam, 2003). Food shortages were common, and placing demand for 
publicly supplied services. Also, agricultural and industrial productions increased by 1.9 
and 3.3 percent per year (De Vylder and Fforde, 1988, p.167). Table 7.1 provides planned 




AVERAGE ECONOMIC GROWTH RATES 
      Percentage rates of growth 
      GDP  Agriculture  Industry 
Five-Year Plan 1976-1980       
 Plan  13-14  8-10  16-18 
 Actual  0.4  1.9  3.3 
Five-Year Plan 1980-1985       
 Plan  4.5-5.0  6.0–7.0  4.0–5.0 
   Actual  6.4  5.3  9.3 
Source: Fforde and De Vylder (1996, p. 167) and Arkadie and Mallon (2003, p. 28).   
 
Period from 1981 to 1985 
Under the Five-Year Plan from 1981 to 1985, priority was given to: (i) stabilise 
and improve living standards; (ii) reorganise and develop productive capacity; (iii) 
improve the circulation and distribution of goods; and (iv) apply science to production 
(Vo, 1990). Economic growth rate was planned to be 5 per cent per annum. Also, 
agricultural and industrial production rates were expected to increase by 7 and 5 per cent 
per year, respectively. Initial results were encouraging. Industrial output and agricultural 
production increased by 9.3 and 5.3 per cent per year (De Vylder and Fforde, 1988, 
p.167). However, the annual inflation rate rose drastically – to as high as 50 per cent in 
the early 1980s, and then to a peak of 587.2 per cent in 1985 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Vietnam, 2003, p.3). 
 
Period from 1986 to 1990 
In December 1986, comprehensive programs of economic reform were initiated in 
Vietnam in an attempt to characterise society as a multi-sector economy following 
market-based operations (Vo, 1990). The average real growth rate for this five-year 
period was 3.9 per cent per year. A priority was also to curb and control inflation. The 
inflation rate was 774.7 per cent in 1986, but decreased to 223.1 per cent, and then to 
34.7 per cent in 1987 and 1988 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003, p.5). In addition, the 
first law on foreign direct investment came into effect in 1987 to attract foreign capital 
into Vietnam’s economy.  
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Period from 1991 to 2000 
A Ten-Year Plan was implemented from 1991 to 2000 with the following specific 
macroeconomic targets: (i) annual growth rate of 7.5 per cent; (ii) real growth rates for 
agriculture and industrial production of 4.0 per cent and 12.5 per cent; and (iii) the per 
capita income to be double the 1990’s level in 2000 (Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, 2002). Two distinct Five-Year Plans (1991–1995 and 1996–2000) were 
implemented within this Ten-Year Plan. Economic growth rate, on average, was at 8.2 
and 7.0 per cent per annum, respectively
2. Table 7.2 presents a summary of key economic 
indicators in Vietnam for five Five-Year Plans, starting from 1976. 
TABLE 7.2 
ANNUAL AVERAGE RATES OF GROWTH AND INFLATION (%) 
Period  Inflation 
(CPI)  GDP Agriculture  Services  Industry 
1976-1980 21.2  0.4  1.9  -0.1  3.3 
1981-1985 74.2  6.4  5.3  4.7  9.3 
1986-1990 298.7  3.9  3.7  8.7  4.7 
1991-1995 23.5  8.2  4.3  9.5  12.6 
1996-2000 3.4  7.0  3.9  7.3  12.2 
Source: Arkadie and Mallon, (2003, p. 28).        
 
The plan for the future (from 2001 and beyond) 
The National Assembly’s Resolution on a Five-Year Plan for 2001–2005 and the 
Strategy for Socio-economic Development for 2001-2010 were drafted with the intention 
of enabling Vietnam to become an industrialised country by 2020. The overall objectives 
are: (i) to achieve a high and stable economic growth rate; (ii) to stabilise and improve 
the standard of living; (iii) to advance economic and labour restructuring towards 
intensified modernisation and industrialisation; (iv) to improve the market economy's 
effectiveness and competitiveness; (v) to extend external economic activities; and (vi) to 
reform education and training, science and technology (IMF, 2004). Total value of GDP 
in 2010 is targeted to double the level in 2000, with a strong transformation of the 
structure of the national economy, particularly focusing on industry, construction and 
                                                 
2 The most significant problem years for the economy over this period were 1997 and 1998 following the 
Asian financial crisis.  155
services. Agriculture, industry, and services are expected to account for 16-17 per cent, 
40-41 per cent, and 42-43 per cent of total GDP in 2010 (IMF, 2004, p.14).  
 
7.5  Fiscal arrangements in Vietnam since 1976 
 
From national reunification in 1975 until 1989, Vietnam effectively remained a 
centralised fiscal and economic system. Unfortunately, fiscal data are not available to 
properly assess this period, which seriously constrains any discussion of fiscal 
decentralisation in Vietnam. Nevertheless, some useful and contextual observation 
pertaining to the period can be made. 
 
From 1976 to 1989 – a general overview 
The allocation of spending and taxing activities between the national government 
and SNGs in this period was loosely provided for by government’s Resolution No. 
108/CP of 1978. Under this Resolution, subnational own-sourced revenues were mainly 
raised from fees, charges and assets’ depreciation. Revenue collection shared between the 
national government and SNGs included revenue from the profit of national and public 
enterprises operating at local jurisdiction, tax on agriculture, and tax on industrial 
activities. The sharing rate was determined by the national government. Under this 
Resolution, revenue for SNGs increased by 43.5 per cent in 1980 compared with 1976, 
whereas spending increased 1.5 per cent in 1980 (Ministry of Finance, 2003). However, 
the Ministry of Finance of Vietnam statistics do not differentiate between local revenue 
collected by SNGs and fully retained, and tax revenue that SNGs must share with the 
national government. From the perspective of fiscal decentralisation theory, the key point 
is that Resolution 108 did not devolve authority to set tax rates and bases from the 
national government to SNGs.  
 
In 1983, the government then issued Resolution 138-HDBT, which clarified 
responsibility for the budget allocations of SNGs, with a clear distinction between local 
own-sourced revenue and revenue shared by local governments with the national 
government. For example, locally-sourced revenue included 100 per cent collection on  156
depreciations, 100 per cent fees and charges, 100 per cent on lottery. Shared revenue 
included 80 per cent profit from locally public enterprises, 10 per cent profit from 
national public enterprises operating at local jurisdiction, 40 per cent revenue from tax on 
agriculture. Also, tax revenue shared between the national government and SNGs 
included revenue from the taxation of industrial activities; agriculture; as well as profits 
from local public enterprises (except portions retained at local budget). Sharing rates 
were also determined by the national government. A subsidy (or transfer) was for 
provinces which were unable to cover their local expenditure with own-sourced and 
shared revenues.  
 
However, tax bases fully controlled by the national government were also 
extended to cover a wide range of services, such as taxes on transportation, and port 
services. Government revenue still reflected a combination of domestic revenue (revenue 
collected) and foreign sources (non-refundable aid and commercial loans). This was the 
period with almost hyperinflation in Vietnam during which government expenditure 
could not be covered by taxes and charges. Between 1981 and 1986, total government 
revenue averaged only 48 per cent of total expenditure (Ministry of Finance, 2003). Debt 
became a major issue in the management of Vietnam’s public finances during this period. 
 
Period from 1986 to 1990 
The Government issued and implemented Resolution 186/HDBT in 1989, which 
was the first regulation on fiscal issues since the economic reforms associated with the 
Five-Year Plan commencing in 1986. Under this Resolution, only spending 
responsibilities and revenue sources for SNGs were regulated. SNGs’ revenue came from 
three different sources: (i) 100 per cent locally collected revenue (revenue collections to 
cover depreciation, taxes on the slaughter of livestock, and fees and charges); (ii) shared 
tax revenue with the national government (revenue from profits of national public 
enterprises, local public enterprises, and taxes on industrial activities); and (iii) 
conditional transfers to balance SNGs' budget, if needed.  
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However, under this new arrangement, revenue sharing became subject to a 
constraint that prevented shared revenue being retained by SNGs. Of the 44 provinces, 14 
actually returned additional revenue to the national government budget from their shared 
revenue because they had balanced their local budgets. Examples included Hai Hung, 
Dong Nai and Ho Chi Minh City. However, as an overall picture, the aggregate public 
sector budget was in deficit, as presented in Table 7.3. 
TABLE 7.3 
THE OPERATIONS OF THE AGGREGATE PUBLIC SECTOR BUDGET 
(Percentage of GDP) 
No.      Year  1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1      Revenue  13.2 12.2 11.3 11.9 13.1 
2      Current  expenditures  13.4 12.8 14.1 12.3 15.1 
3     Government savings [(1) - (2)] -0.2 -0.6 -2.8 -0.4 -2.0 
4     Capital expenditures  5.6  3.9  4.4  6.4  4.5 
5     Overall budget deficit [(3) - (4)]* -5.8  -4.4  -7.1  -6.8  -6.5 
   Financing:         
6     Foreign loans and grants  2.2  1.4  2.4  1.5  4.0 
7     Credit from State bank (net)  3.6  2.9  2.9  6.0  2.5 
    Note: Figures do not add exactly due to rounding.       
Source: Table 8.2 (Fforde and De Vylder, 1996, p.301). 
 
From 1990 onwards – a move towards a more systematic fiscal decentralisation 
In 1990, a national tax system was introduced including nine different taxes: (i) 
Tax on agriculture; (ii) Turnover tax; (iii) Special sales tax (Excises tax); (iv) Profit tax; 
(v) Export and import duties; (vi) Tax on natural resources; (vii) Personal income tax; 
(viii) Tax on houses and land; and (ix) Tax on capital users. Also, within the tax system, 
fees and charges were also provided for. In 1997, the Value added tax and Corporate 
income tax were introduced to replace the turnover tax and profit tax. In addition, Export 
and import duties, Special sales tax, and Personal income tax have been substantially 
revised.  
 
Vietnam’s first “Budget Law” was issued in 1996, coming into effect in 1997. 
This is a statute of the national government – the National Assembly. The law outlined  158
the spending responsibility and revenue allocations
3   for national and subnational 
governments and regulated subnational borrowing and intergovernmental fiscal transfers. 
The 1997 Budget Law was revised in 1998, with changes coming into effect from 1999. 
In regard to fiscal decentralisation, the significant change to the 1999 revised Budget Law 
resulted in lower tiers of SNGs (district and commune levels) being assured of greater 
revenue and greater expenditure responsibilities. Also, the 1997 Budget Law provided for 
commune level government (the lowest tier of SNGs) to secure at least 70 per cent their 
revenue from taxes on the right of land transfer; land and housing tax; licence tax from 
small businesses and agricultural tax.  
 
The “new” Budget Law of 2004 also attempted to facilitate even greater levels of 
fiscal activities by SNGs. Specifically, it ensured that the excise tax was no longer to 
remain an exclusively national government taxation instrument. Instead, excise tax was 
divided into two portions: (i) an excise tax on imports, which became a national 
government revenue and (ii) an excise tax on domestic goods and services, which became 
a subnational government revenue. A summary of key regulations on these issues from 
the 1997, 1999 and 2004 Budget Laws is presented in Table 7.4
4. 
 
The process of fiscal decentralisation also gained further momentum with the 
issuance of Decree No. 93/2001/ND-CP by the national government in 2001. This decree 
provided for increasingly decentralised public administration in Ho Chi Minh City, with 
the emphasis on: (i) management of investment and socio-economic development; (ii) 
management of land, housing and local infrastructure; (iii) fiscal decentralisation; and 
(iv) organising and monitoring its local officials
5. The program was subsequently 
extended to Hanoi and Haiphong in 2004.  
 
 
                                                 
3Tax assignment is an assignment of authority which national governments cannot unilaterally impose or 
revoke. In Vietnam, the national government has the power to do just that. As such, the term “tax 
allocation” is used. 
4 A summary of full details can be found in Appendix A7.3.  
5 Of course, it is significant that this Decree is issued by the national government – an indication of the 
underlying legal authority of the national government over fiscal matters.  159
TABLE 7.4 
A SUMMARY OF KEY REGULATIONS OVER FISCAL ISSUES 
VIETNAM’S BUDGET LAWS 1997, 1999 AND 2004. 
1. Expenditure responsibilities 
National government 
a.  Spending on economic activities, education, 
training, medicine, technology and environment 
under national control. 
b.  Economic operations under the control of 
central organs. 
c.  Defence, security and social order under 
national control. 
d.  Operations of central organs of the Communist 
Party of Vietnam, the national and socio-
political organisations. 
e.  Price subsidy under national policy. 
f.  National programs under central control, etc. 
 
Subnational governments 
a.  Spending on economic activities, education, 
training, medicine, technology and environment 
under provincial control. 
b.  Defence, security and social order assigned 
from the national government. 
c.  Operations of central organs and socio-political 
organisations at provincial level. 
d.  Support for social and career organisations 
under provincial control. 
e.  Spending on social policies under their control. 
f.  National programs under provincial control as 
assigned by the national government, etc. 
 
2. Sources of revenue 
National government 
a.  Export and import duties. 
b.  Excises tax on import. 
c.  Profit tax from nation-wide businesses. 
d.  Taxes and other revenues from oil and gas. 
e.  Capital withdrawing and profit sharing from 
joint-venture, joint-stock companies with the 
contribution of national capital, etc. 
 
Subnational governments 
a.  Rental of land. 
b.  Income from selling and renting national 
properties under provincial management. 
c.  Registration tax. 
d.  Revenues from lotteries. 
e.  Non-refundable aids directly to provincial 
governments, etc. 
 
Shared tax revenue 
a.  Value added tax. 
b.  Profit tax, except profit tax from nation-wide businesses. 
c.  Personal income tax. 
d.  Natural resources tax. 
e.  Capital user charges. 
 
3. Intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
 
Criteria used in defining the amount of fiscal transfers are population, natural conditions, economic-social 
conditions of specific areas; particularly focusing on rural areas, remote areas, minority ethnic areas, areas 
with difficulties. Fiscal transfer amounts are kept constant for the period from 3 to 5 years and are inflation-
indexed. 
 
4. Subnational borrowing 
 
Provincial governments are allowed to arrange domestic borrowing to meet the needs of investing in 
infrastructure and they must balance their budget to repay debt in due course.  The balance from the debt 
must not exceed 30 per cent of total capital on basic infrastructure yearly within the provincial budget. 
 
Source: Vietnam’s Budget Laws 1997, 1999, and 2004.  160
In summary, policy measures to increase fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam were 
being set in place from the mid-1990s, especially through the introduction of the Budget 
Laws of 1997, 1999 and 2004. The specific changes in the tax assignment and tax 
allocation across the national government and SNGs that have increased fiscal 
decentralisation since 1990 are summarised in Table 7.5
6. 
TABLE 7.5 
TAX ASSIGNMENT AND ALLOCATION IN VIETNAM 
No.  Year  1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 1999 2004 
1  Value added tax
a  S S S S S S S 
2 Corporate  income  tax
b S S S S S S S 
3  Excise  tax  C C C C C S S 
4  Export-import  duties  C S C C C C C 
5  Personal  income  tax  * * L L S S S 
6  Tax on natural resources  *  S  S  S  S  L  L 
7 Profit  remittance  tax
c * * * * S S S 
8  Agricultural  tax  S S L L L L L 
9  Land  and  housing  tax  * L L L L L L 
10  Tax on land use rights  *  *  *  L  L  L  L 
11  License  tax  * L L L L L L 
12  Registration  tax  * L L L L L L 
13  Slaughter  tax  * L L L L L * 
Notes:  C - Central; L - Local   
 
S represents Shared by central and local levels, but the sovereignty over tax bases and rates 
remains with the central government. 
  a/ Turnover tax before 1999;   b/ Profit tax before 1999; and c/ Abolished in 2004. 
  *  No information available.       
Source: Author’s review of laws listed in Appendix A7.2. 
 
Exclusively national government taxes include export–import duties and excise 
tax. The shared taxes between the national government and SNGs consist of the value 
added tax; corporate income tax; and personal income tax. Many minor taxes are 
allocated as SNGs’ own-sourced taxes such as tax on transfers of properties, licence tax, 
                                                 
6 Examples of regulations and laws that shaped the allocations include: 1990 as a result of Resolution 186; 
1992 (Decision 168); 1994 (Decision 60); 1996 (Decision 861); 1997 (Budget Law 1997); 1999 (revised 
Budget Law 1998) and 2004 (Budget Law 2004).  
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agricultural tax, land and housing tax, and tax on land use rights. Importantly though, 
regardless of whether a tax is a national tax or shared tax, the tax bases and rates are 
centrally determined. In view of this, it is evident that the assignment and allocation of 
taxes in Vietnam since 1990, has dealt primarily with the issue of the “fiscal importance” 
of SNGs – that is, with the share of total public sector expenditure undertaken by SNGs.  
 
Personal income tax - a shared tax after the introduction of the 1997 Budget Law 
is something of a special case in Vietnam. International experience has shown that 
personal income tax usually generates a significant share of total taxation revenue in 
many countries. However, this is not the case in Vietnam. Maintaining the personal 
income tax as a shared tax may well be seen by the national government as prudent, 
particularly if Vietnam needs to implement any requirements imposed by the World Bank 
on debt management and from the World Trade Organisation.   
  TABLE 7.6 
APPROXIMATE TAX ALLOCATION IN VIETNAM IN 2003 
  Item  Per cent of total tax revenue 
  TAXES OVER WHICH THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT RETAINS AUTHORITY 
  A. National taxes    
 Export-import duties  24   
 Excise tax  9  
 Subtotal    33 
  B. Shared taxes    
 Value added tax  30   
 Corporate income tax  31   
 Personal income tax  3  
 Subtotal    64 
 TAXES OVER WHICH THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RETAIN ANY AUTHORITY
  C. Subnational taxes    
 Licence tax, etc.  2   
 Tax on transfers of properties  1  
 Subtotal    3 
 Total    100 
 Source: IMF (2003) and author's calculations.  162
Tax assignment and allocation in Vietnam for 2003 reveal that almost two-thirds 
of total tax revenue is generated by shared taxes, as shown in Table 7.6. As noted earlier, 
shared tax revenues are not SNGs’ own-sourced revenue because responsibilities for 
these taxes are derived from the national government’s power. The sharing rate applied 
for shared taxes is also predetermined by the national government. As national taxes 
account for one-third of the total revenue, it can be seen that responsibility for fiscal 
arrangements in Vietnam remains significantly centralised. SNGs’ own-sourced revenue 
accounts for only 3 per cent total tax revenue. Taken as a whole, this provides prima facie 
evidence of a still substantial degree of “centralised” fiscal arrangements in Vietnam, 
even after the important fiscal changes introduced in 1990 which have increased the level 
of fiscal activity by SNGs.  
 
Returning revenue to the national government 
Shared taxes between the national government and SNGs provide an interesting 
example of the mechanism by which the fiscal importance of SNGs increases over time. 
With a well-endowed region with expected revenue that is greater than its minimum 
expenditure need, revenue from shared taxes must be transferred to the national budget at 
a rate to be centrally determined, whereas less well-endowed provinces receive all 100 
per cent of shared tax revenue. For example, in 2002, the allocations of shared tax 
revenue to SNGs vary with Ho Chi Minh City (the economic centre) and Hanoi (the 
capital city) receiving just 24 per cent and 30 per cent shared tax revenue. Also, Ba Ria – 
Vung Tau, Binh Duong, and Dong Nai - three of the largest provinces – received 48 per 
cent, 52 per cent, and 53 per cent. In contrast, the majority of provinces received 100 per 
cent revenue from shared taxes.  
 
Figure 7.2 reveals that, for the nine biggest provinces and cities (in terms of 
subnational revenue and expenditure), only Ho Chi Minh City and Dong Nai could “more 
than” fund their total spending from the sum of own-sourced revenue and their revenue 
shared with the national government. All other provinces in this sample run a deficit or a 
balanced budget.  
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FIGURE 7.2














      Source: Ministry of Finance, Vietnam. 
 
Implicit equalisation 
Like other developing countries, Vietnam suffers from the fiscal imbalance in 
both vertical and horizontal dimensions. The country has an implicit system of 
equalisation grants, although it is very partial in character
7. A partial and unsystematic 
form of fiscal equalisation applies in Vietnam on the basis of the difference between the 
expected revenue and the minimum expenditure needs of SNGs. Expected revenues are 
determined by: (i) the subnational branch of tax administration, on the basis of the actual 
revenue collections of the previous years, taking into account changes in tax policies in 
the year and (ii) expected economic growth rate during the year. The minimum 
expenditure needs of SNGs are calculated on the basis of the expenditure norms 
determined by the national government (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004, p.26). The difference 
between expected revenue and minimum expected expenditure needs has laid the 
foundation for the national government to decide the tax sharing rates which are applied 
to revenue from the shared taxes between national government and SNGs. If the expected 
                                                 
7 In addition, Vietnam does not have an explicit separate system of capital transfers. Funds for capital 
investment are tailored in the equalisation transfer and are basically very limited (Martinez-Vazquez, 
2004). Table 7.8 of Section 7.6 decomposes the components in the SNGs’ revenue, together with fiscal 
transfers from the national government, in relation to their expenditure responsibilities for the selected 
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revenue (from both own-sourced and shared taxes) is less than its minimum expenditure 
need, then all proceeds from shared taxes are kept at the subnational budget level.  
 
Under this arrangement, fiscal transfers are partially achieved through shared tax 
revenue arrangements. The major proportion of any remaining intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers in Vietnam is in the form of conditional transfers in which SNGs have to follow 
national requirements on how these funds are expended. As a result, fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs on fiscal transfers is also very limited. This conclusion is also accurate on SNGs 
borrowings because SNGs are not generally allowed to arrange borrowings at their own 
discretion. 
 
7.6  Vietnam and fiscal decentralisation – a critical assessment 
  
Since national reunification in 1976, the fiscal environment in Vietnam has 
changed significantly. This change can be confirmed in different legal documents 
governing fiscal arrangements issued in the period. It is generally agreed that Vietnam is 
pursuing a deliberate policy of process of fiscal decentralisation (Martinez-Vazquez, 
2004, p.10) but, as we have seen, it has been subject to serious limitations. In relation to 
SNGs’ expenditure and revenue shared in the total public finance sector, Vietnam can be 
considered moderately decentralised (Martinez-Vazquez, 2004, p.13). However, without 
considering the issue of fiscal autonomy of SNGs, a well considered conclusion on the 
level of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam cannot be reached
8. 
 
7.6.1  The fiscal importance of subnational governments in Vietnam 
 
For the purpose of this study, the fiscal importance of SNGs is defined in Chapter 
3 as the extent to which public sector expenditure is undertaken by SNGs. On that basis, a 
clear and significant conclusion can be reached on the fiscal importance of SNGs in 
                                                 
8 We should again state that, due to significant data and information limitations, this section only explores 
the two important issues of fiscal decentralisation - fiscal autonomy and the fiscal importance of SNGs, 
for the period from 1997 (the introduction of the First Budget Law) to 2004 (the Budget Law of 2004).  
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Vietnam. SNGs shared a significant portion of total public sector revenue and 
expenditure. The outcomes of the government budget revenue and expenditure 
decentralisation in Vietnam are shown in Table 7.7. 
TABLE 7.7 
REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE DECENTRALISATION IN VIETNAM 
          1997      1998     1999     2000     2001     2002      2003      2004 
Revenue (VND billions)  65,352 70,612 78,489 90,749 103,773 121,716  141,930 149,320
Of which:   
  SNGs’ budget revenue (a)  19,264 20,280 19,571 22,269 25,463 30,545  38,683 44,743
  Share of total budget revenue  29.5 28.7 24.9 24.5 24.5 25.1  27.3 30.0
% growth rate (previous year = 100%)                 
  Total budget revenue  4.8 8 11.2 15.6 14.4 17.3  16.6 5.2
 SNGs’  budget  revenue  8.5 5.3 -3.5 13.8 14.3 20.0  26.6 15.7
Expenditure (VND billions)  78,057 81,995 95,972 108,961 129,773 148,208 177,150 187,670
O f   w h i c h :             
 SNGs’  expenditure  28,039 31,808 39,040 45,082 56,043 64,573 66,254 67,184
  Share of total expenditure  35.9 38.8 40.7 41.4 43.2 43.6  37.4 35.8
% growth rate (previous year = 100%)                 
  Total budget expenditure  10.7 5.0 17.0 13.5 19.1 14.2  19.5 5.9
 SNGs’  budget  expenditure  19.1 13.4 22.7 15.5 24.3 15.2  2.6 1.5
Fiscal transfers (VND billions)  9,964 12,290 20,510 26,601 23,553 35,278 38,040 35,048
  % growth rate (previous year = 100%)  35.4 23.3 66.9 29.7 -11.5 49.8  7.8 -7.9
  Share of total SNGs’ expenditure  35.5 38.6 52.5 59.0 42.0 54.6  57.4 52.2
(a)  SNGs’ budget revenue comprises own-sourced revenue, and revenues from taxes shared with the national 
           government. 
Source: Martinez-Vazquez (2004, p. 16) from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance. 
 
In terms of expenditure undertaken by SNGs, for the period considered, total 
SNGs’ expenditure is around 40 per cent of total government spending. Consequently, in 
regard to the aspect of fiscal importance, Vietnam may be regarded as a moderately 
decentralised country. This view is backed up by the fact that fiscal activities undertaken 
by SNGs account for more than one-third of aggregate public sector expenditure. The 
Budget Law of 2004 stipulated the service provision responsibilities of the national 
government include spending on defence, national security, economic activities,  166
education and training, and the environment. The scope of SNGs’ service provision 
responsibilities includes economic activities, education and training and others under the 
subnational control. However, spending on higher education tends to fall within the scope 
of the national government, whereas the system of elementary, secondary and high 
schools is administered by the subnational budget
9. Nevertheless, there is some overlap 
between the national government and SNGs over responsibility for service provisions, 
such as on economic activities, education and training. 
 
Table 7.7 also indicates that SNGs’ share of total public sector revenue is around 
30 per cent. This is significant, being slightly below SNGs’ expenditure shares. When 
considered in relation to SNGs’ revenue, it may look like the vertical fiscal imbalance is 
low. However, many SNGs’ revenues in Table 7.7 are not own-sourced revenues. They 
include revenue from taxes shared with the national government. As the base and the rate 
of these taxes are controlled by the national government, SNGs’ autonomy is restricted, 
as discussed in Section 7.6.2.  
 
7.6.2  The fiscal autonomy of subnational governments in Vietnam 
 
The current Budget Law (2004) outlines the responsibilities for service provision 
of the national government and the SNGs, but the actual allocation is unclear because 
some service responsibilities overlap. The more fundamental issue though is that, in 
Vietnam, the national government unilaterally allocates the service obligations across the 
various levels of government. There is no clear assignment – no constitutional allocation 
– of responsibilities for the provision of specific services. As a result, the autonomy of 
SNGs in Vietnam over their spending programs is weak. The result is the national 
government directs both co-sharing of expenditures on related services and revenue.  
 
Under current practice in Vietnam, provincial governments are allowed to borrow 
from domestic sources by issuing bonds to fund capital investment such as investment on 
basic infrastructure. However, provincial governments must run balanced recurrent 
                                                 
9 Details can be found in Appendix A7.3.  167
budgets. Also, debt must not exceed 30 per cent of total capital from investment in basic 
infrastructure within provincial budgets. The only exclusion for international borrowing 
applies to Ho Chi Minh City, Hanoi and Haiphong – the three largest cities in Vietnam. 
However, even for these largest cities, direct overseas borrowing is not permitted. The 
city’s government looks for a source of funding, negotiates terms and conditions and then 
requests the national government to undertake the borrowings and on lending to the city. 
 
In regards to revenue assignment, the autonomy of SNGs is similarly restricted. 
Even though SNGs share 30 per cent of total public sector revenues, fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs is much less than this implies. Three restricting factors are of fundamental 
importance to fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam. First, the national government sets tax 
bases and rates for all shared tax revenue. Second, SNGs only autonomously set rates for 
fees and charges, which comprise an insignificant share of their budget. Third, 
subnational tax authorities often collect revenues arising within their administrative 
regions on the national government’s behalf. As Table 7.8 reveals, shared national and 
subnational taxes play a very important portion in subnational budget revenues. SNGs 
have very limited discretion to change these bases and rates. SNGs have very limited 
capacity to adjust their revenue yield. Also, the types of taxes to be shared and the 
proportion in which the taxes are shared are set by the national government and purely 
local taxes are extremely limited in Vietnam.  
TABLE 7.8 
SOURCES OF REVENUE OF SELECTED PROVINCES AND CITIES IN VIETNAM IN 2002 
(VND billions unless otherwise stated) 













1. Ha  Noi  3,188  23  42  35  100  4,299 
2. Hai  Phong  1,316  21  41  38  100  1,628 
3. Da  Nang  752  33  37  30  100  1,131 
4. Khanh  Hoa  774  30  29  41  100  1,035 
5.  Ho Chi Minh City  5,137  60  31  9  100  6,925 
6. Dong  Nai  1,207  32  47  21  100  1,533 
7. Binh  Duong  692  34  41  25  100  972 
8.  Ba Ria Vung Tau  1,111  19  65  16  100  1,849 
9. Can  Tho  948  31  33  37  100  1,127 
Source: Derived from Martinez-Vazquez (2004, p. 29).       168
 
Figure 7.3 shows the relationship between SNGs’ expenditures by several large 
SNGs relative to their “own-sourced” taxation revenue given they have autonomy in 
setting tax rates and tax bases. Significantly, all 64 provinces and cities in Vietnam rely 
on the national government for support, either through revenues from tax sharing and/or 
from direct conditional grants because the selected localities are the biggest provinces in 













  Source: Ministry of Finance, Vietnam. 
 
7.6.3  The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation (FDI) in Vietnam: 1997–2007. 
 
Using the FDI developed under the “fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance” 
approach outlined in Chapter 3, the degree of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam can be 
estimated over the period 1997 to 2007. It is noted that SNGs’ shared revenue accounts 
for about 64 per cent of total public sector revenue as shown in Table 7.6 of this chapter, 
based on data from the IMF. Also, SNGs’ own-sourced revenue is equal to 36 per cent of 
total SNGs’ revenue, based on data from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance
10. To distinguish 
between the difference in fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs in Vietnam, the 
FDI is presented in its component parts.  
                                                 
10 While SNGs’ own-sourced revenue accounts for 36 per cent of subnational revenues, it accounts for only 
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  Source: Author’s calculations, using data from Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance, various years. 
 
Figure 7.4 shows the indices of fiscal decentralisation for Vietnam as well as 
indices of its two components: “fiscal autonomy” and “fiscal importance”. It is strikingly 
clear that the degree of fiscal decentralisation evident in Vietnam has not trended 
upwards, but between 1997 and 2002, there has been a successful policy of shifting fiscal 
activities down from the national government to SNGs (i.e. fiscal importance of SNGs). 
There has been no corresponding decentralisation of responsibility for expenditure and 
revenue decisions to SNGs (i.e. fiscal autonomy of SNGs).  
 
7.7  Concluding remarks 
 
This chapter has reviewed the recent history and current state of fiscal 
decentralisation in Vietnam. On balance, it is concluded that the current state of fiscal 
arrangement in Vietnam is still relatively centralised. SNGs are allocated significant 
shares of revenue raising and spending activities by the national government, but the 
responsibility for such decisions has not been devolved. Prima facie, Vietnam is 
Fiscal importance 
Fiscal autonomy 
Fiscal decentralisation index  170
moderately decentralised when fiscal importance of SNGs is considered in isolation. 
However, this view in isolation is misleading - fiscal autonomy of SNGs must also be 
considered. Moderate fiscal decentralisation can only be completely realised when SNGs 
are given more autonomy in their spending programs and by assigning real, 
constitutionally protected, tax-raising powers to SNGs. As such, genuine reforms to 
advance fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam still have some way to go.   171
Appendix A7.1
11 
LIST OF LEGAL DOCUMENTS 
 
  
Non-constitutional statutes that define the structure of the Vietnamese State: 
 
 
-  Ordinance No. 51/2001/QH10 dated 25 December 2001 on revision of some 
articles in the Constitution 1992. 
-  Law 31/2001/QH10 dated 25 December 2002 on the Election of members of the 
National Assembly (revised). 
-  Law in 1997 dated 15 April 1997 on the Election of the National Assembly. 
-  Law 05/2003/QH11 dated 17 June 2003 on the supervisions of the National 
Assembly. 
-  Resolution 26/2004/QH11 dated 15 June 2004 on Regulations on activities of the 
Standing Committee of National Assembly.  
-  Law 32/2001/Qh10 dated 25 December 2001 on the Organisation of Government. 
-  Law 33/2002/QH10 dated 22 April 2002 on the Organisation of The Supreme 
People’s Court. 
-  Law 34/2002/QH10 dated 02 April 2002 on the Organisation of The Supreme 
People’s Procuracy. 
-  Law 11/2003/QH11 dated 26 November 2003 on the Organisations of People’s 
Councils and People’s Committees. 
-  Law 12/2003/QH11 dated 26 November 2003 on the Election of People’s 
Councils. 
 
Source: Law data at www.na.gov.vn. 
                                                 
11 Under the current legislation of Vietnam, the Constitution is the highest legal document of the nation and 
the National Assembly is the only organ to promulgate or revise the Constitution. Since 1945, Vietnam 
has had four Constitutions in 1946, 1959, 1980 and 1992.  172
Appendix A7.2 
 
LEGAL DOCUMENTS FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF TAX ALLOCATION 
 IN VIETNAM: FROM 1990 TO 2004 
 
1.  Resolution No. 108/CP dated 13 May 1978 and came into effect on 01/01/1979.  
2.  Resolution 138-HDBT dated 19 November 1983 and came into effect on 
01/01/1984.  
3.  Resolution 186-HDBT in 1989 and came into effect on 01/01/1990. 
4.  Decision 168-HDBT dated 16
th May 1992 and came into effect on 01/01/1992. 
5.  Decision 60-TTg dated 08/02/1994 and came into effect in the financial year 
1994. 
6.  Decision 861/TTg dated 30/12/1995 and came into effect in 1996. 
7.  The Law on the Government budget in 1996 and came into effect on 01/01/1997. 
8.  The Law on the Government budget in 1998 (revised for Law in 1996) and came 
into effect on 01/01/1999. 
9.  The Law on the Government budget in 2002 and came into effect on 01/01/2004. 
10. Decrees No. 123/2004/ND-CP dated 18 May 2004 on “The Specific Fiscal 
Regime” for Hanoi and came into effect after 15 days of its publication. 
11. Decree 124/2004/ND-CP dated 18 May 2004 on “The Specific Fiscal Regime” 
for Ho Chi Minh City and came into effect after 15 days of its publication.  
12. Decision 54/2004/QD-TTg dated 05 April 2004 on “The Preferential Fiscal 
Regime” for Haiphong and came into effect after 15 days of its publication.  
 
Source: Law data at www.na.gov.vn. 
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Appendix A7.3 





I.  BUDGET LAW 1997 
 
A. NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The spending responsibilities for the national government could be summarised as follows: 
 
1. Current expenditure: 
g.  Spending on economic activities, education, training, medicine, social and cultural events, 
informatics, science, technology and environment under national control. 
h.  Economic operations under the control of national organs. 
i.  Defence, security and social order except those assigned to subnational governments. 
j.  Operations of central organs of the Communist Party of Vietnam, the national and socio-political 
organisations. 
k.  Price subsidy under national policy. 
l.  National programs under national control. 
m.  Support to social contribution funds in accordance with the government’s regulations. 
n.  Subsidy to people in the targeted programs. 
o.  Subsidy to social and career organisations. 
p.  Interest payments for government’s loans. 
q.  Aids. 
r.  Other spending. 
 
2. Capital expenditure: 
a.  Investments on subsidised infrastructure projects under national control; 
b.  Investment and supports for State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs); capital contributions for joint-stock, 
joint-venture companies in the field that required the presence of national contribution of capital. 
c.  Subsidy for national-supported funds and development-assisted funds to projects and programs for 
economic development. 
d.  National reserves. 
 
3.  Repayment of government’s loans. 
 
4.  Spending for supplement financial reserves. 
 
5.  Fiscal transfer to subnational governments. 
 
B. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
 
1. Current expenditure: 
g.  Spending on economic activities, education, training, medicine, social and cultural events, science, 
technology and environment under provincial control. 
h.  Defence, security and social order assigned to provincial governments. 
i.  Operations of central organs of the country, Communist Party of Vietnam and socio-political 
organisations at provincial level. 
j.  Supports for social and career organisations under provincial control. 
k.  Spending on social policies under provincial control.  174
l.  National programs under provincial control as assigned by the national government. 
m.  Price subsidy under the provincial policy. 
n.  Interest payments for provincial loans. 
o.  Other spending. 
 
2. Capital expenditure: 
a.  Investments on infrastructure projects under provincial control. 
b.  Investment and support for State-Owned Enterprises. 
 
3.  Repayment of provincial loans. 
 
4.  Spending for supplementary financial reserves. 
 
5.  Fiscal transfer to lower tiers of governments. 
 
C. SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AT DISTRICT LEVEL 
 
1. Current expenditure: 
a.  Spending on economic activities, education, social and cultural events, and others under district 
control. 
b.  Defence, security and social order assigned to district governments. 
c.  Operations of central organs of the state, Communist Party of Vietnam and socio-political 
organisations at district level. 
d.  Support for social and career organisations under district control. 
e.  Other spending. 
f.  Besides the above, cities under a direct provincial control are required to allocate spending on 
management and maintenance of public projects. 
 
2. Capital expenditure: 
a.  Investments on infrastructure projects under district control as assigned by the provincial 
government. 
b.  With cities under a direct provincial control, they are required to allocate spending on investment 
to build public elementary, secondary and high schools and public welfare programs, lighting, 
electricity, water supply, internal traffic, traffic safety and local hygiene. 
 
3.  Fiscal transfer to lower tiers of governments. 
 
D. SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AT COMMUNE LEVEL 
 
1.  Current expenditure: 
a.  Spending on social and cultural events under commune control. 
b.  Support for educationally-supplemented programs, kindergartens under commune control. 
c.  Operations of medicine at commune level. 
d.  Management, repair and maintenance of architecturally important buildings, welfare programs and 
local public transportation under commune control. 
e.  Operations of central organs of the nation, Communist Party of Vietnam and socio-political 
organisations at commune level. 
f.  Social orders at commune level. 
g.  Other spending. 
 
2. Capital expenditure: 





II.  Revised Law 1999 
 
No changes for expenditure responsibilities of national and provincial governments.  However, there was a 
change for expenditure responsibilities for governments at district level. Spending on education, training 
and medicine, which were previously assigned to the provincial government, is now the scope of 
subnational spending at district level. 
 
III.  Law 2004 
 
There are no changes in this 2004 Law in comparison with the first two laws.  However, there was an 
important insertion in the section of responsibilities for the national government.  Spending of loan funds is 
now the scope of national spending. 
 
 
Source: The Ministry of Finance of Vietnam, at www.mof.gov.vn  176
Appendix A7.3.2 
SOURCES OF REVENUE 
 
I.   Budget Law 1997 
 
A.   NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 
 
The following sources are the national government’s revenue: 
 
1.   Sources for 100 per cent revenue for the national government: 
 
Revenue from: 
f.  Export tax and import duties. 
g.  Excises tax. 
h.  Profit tax from nationwide businesses. 
i.  Taxes and other revenues from oil and gas. 
j.  Capital withdrawing and profit-sharing from joint-venture, joint-stock companies with the 
presence of the national capital; revenue from the national reserves. 
k.  Government’s loans, non-refundable aids from overseas nations and international organisations. 
l.  Fees and other revenue paid to the national government. 
m.  Revenue from the accrued balance of the national budget. 
n.  Other non-tax revenues. 
 
2.    Shared revenue between national and provincial governments: 
 
Revenue from the following sources are subject to be shared between national and provincial governments. 
Sharing rates are predetermined by the national government: 
f.  Turnover tax. 
g.  Profit tax, except profit tax from nationwide businesses. 
h.  Income tax for high-income earners. 
i.  Profit remittance tax. 
j.  Natural resources tax. 
k.  Capital user charges. 
 
 
B.   PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT 
 
1.   Sources for 100 per cent revenue for provincial government: 
 
Revenue from: 
f.  Rental of land. 
g.  Income from selling and renting national properties given to provinces to be managed and 
utilised. 
h.  Registration tax. 
i.  Revenues from lotteries. 
j.  Non-refundable aids directly to provincial governments. 
k.  Other fees and charges determined by the national government to be paid to provincial budget. 
l.  Mobilisation from individuals, organisations to invest in infrastructure. 
m.  Voluntary contributions from domestic and overseas organisations and individuals directly to 
subnational government budget. 
n.  Revenue from the accrued balance of the provincial budget. 
o.  Fiscal transfers from the national government. 
p.  Other collections. 
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2.    Shared tax between national and provincial governments: 
 
  As in Section A.2 
 
3.      Shared tax between provincial, district and commune governments: 
 
Revenue from the following sources is subject to be shared between provincial and district governments. 
Sharing rates are predetermined by the central government: 
a.  Agricultural tax. 
b.  Tax on the rights transfer of agricultural land. 
c.  Land and housing tax. 
d.  Fees on land usages. 
 
 
C.   SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT AT DISTRICT LEVEL 
 
1.    Sources for 100 per cent revenue for the government at district level: 
 
Revenue from: 
a.  Licence tax; except licence tax from small businesses at wards. 
b.  Slaughter tax. 
c.  Fees and charges from activities implemented and managed by organisations at district levels. 
d.  Administrative receipts from units managed by district levels. 
e.  Non-refundable aids directly to district governments. 
f.  Fees to provincial government as regulated by the national government. 
g.  Mobilisation from individuals, organisations to invest in infrastructure. 
h.  Voluntary contributions from domestic and overseas sources directly to subnational budget at 
district level. 
i.  Revenue from the accrued balance of the district budget. 
j.  Fiscal transfers from the provincial government. 
k.  Other revenue. 
 
2.      Shared tax between provincial, district and commune governments: 
  As in Section B.3 
 
3.   Except the above revenue, the local budget of cities under the direct control of the province will 
also be allocated sharing revenue of turnover tax, profit tax and licence tax which are collected 
within the respective administrative region with a predetermined sharing rate.  In addition, 
investment funds can be set up in accordance with regulations from the national government. 
 
 
D.   LOCAL GOVERNMENT AT COMMUNE LEVEL 
 
1.    Sources for 100 per cent revenue for the government at commune level: 
 
Revenue from: 
a.  Licence tax from small businesses at commune. 
b.  Slaughter tax. 
c.  Fees from operations under commune control. 
d.  Revenue from usage of public land. 
e.  Revenue from operations of non-productive activities. 
f.  Non-refundable aids directly to commune governments. 
g.  Revenue from the accrued balance of the commune budget. 
h.  Fiscal transfers from higher-tier governments. 
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2.      Shared tax between province, district and ward governments: 
    As in Section B.3 
 
 
II.   Revised Law 1999 
 
•  There were two main changes in the tax system of Vietnam in 1997.  The Value added tax 
replaced Turnover tax and the Corporate income tax replaced Profit tax. 
 
•  With these changes, in terms of the allocations of revenue, there were some changes as follows: 
 
o  Regarding Corporate Income Tax:  no changes (i.e. only the name of the tax changed). 
 
o  Regarding VAT: changes are as follows: 
  VAT on import: revenue for the national government. 
  Other VAT: revenue for subnational governments at provincial level. 
 
•  The sharing rates of taxes between the provincial government to subnational governments at 
district and commune levels are determined by the Provincial People’s Committees. 
 
•  It is required that revenue from agricultural tax for the local budget at commune levels should not 
be less than 20 per cent total revenue from this type of tax. 
 
 
III.   Budget Law 2004 
 
•  Revenue from the Excise tax is no longer the national government’s revenue.  Revenue from this 
tax is divided into two portions: 
 
o  Excise tax on imports is national government’s revenue. 
 
o  Excise tax on domestic goods and services is subnational governments’ revenue. 
 
•  The sharing rates of taxes between the provincial government to governments at district and 
commune levels are determined by the Provincial People’s Councils. 
 
•  The local budget of cities under a direct control of the province is allocated at least 50 per cent 
revenue from the licence tax from the provincial government. 
 
•  Local budget of the governments at commune level is allocated at least 70 per cent revenue from 
tax on the rights transfer of land; land and housing tax; licence tax from small businesses and 
agricultural tax.  
 
 





I.   Budget Law 1997 
 
 
The provincial government is allowed to make domestic borrowing to meet the needs of investing 
in basic infrastructures with decisions from the Prime Minister, and the provincial government 
itself must balance its budget to repay debt in due course. 
 
 
II.   Budget Law 2004 
 
 
The provincial government is allowed to make domestic borrowing to meet the needs of investing 
in basic infrastructures and the provincial government itself must balance its budget to repay debt 
in due course. The balance from the debt must not exceed 30 per cent of total capital investment in 
basic infrastructure yearly within the provincial budget. 
 
 
Source: The Ministry of Finance of Vietnam, at www.mof.gov.vn  180
Appendix A7.3.4 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 
 
 
I.   Budget Law 1996 
 
 
•  Fiscal transfer from the national government to subnational governments to ensure that 
the subnational governments are capable of implementing the socio-economic 
responsibilities assigned by the national government. 
 
•  Criteria used in defining the amount of fiscal transfers are population, natural conditions, 
socio-economic conditions of specific area; particularly focusing on rural areas, remote 
areas, minority ethnic areas, areas with other difficulties. 
 
•  Fiscal transfer amounts are kept constant for the period from 3 to 5 years. 
 
•  Inflation-indexed fiscal transfer amount. 
 
 
II.   Revised Budget Law 1999 
 
 




III   Budget Law 2004 
 
 
The higher level of government will decide the amount of fiscal transfers on the basis of particular 
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CHAPTER 8 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION IN CHINA AND SELECTED ASEAN NATIONS 
 
8.1  Introduction 
 
China has become one of the largest economies in the world in the ten years since 
its economic reform in 1990. The size of the economy, as represented by GDP, was 
around 43 per cent GDP of the United States (“US”) in 1997. However, its income per 
capita, at around 9 per cent of the US level, is still well below that of rich developed 
countries (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, 1997, p.11). Since 
1990, China has experienced a yearly average rate of economic growth of more than 10 
per cent. This significant achievement has laid the strong and steady foundation for China 
to advance and become one of the leading economies in the world in the future.  
 
China has set up a close relationship with The Association of South-East Asian 
Nations (“ASEAN”) concerning economic development and cooperation and regional 
peace and security. ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five 
original member countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and 
Thailand. Five new members have joined the Association since then, including Brunei 
Darussalam on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 
1997 and Cambodia on 30 April 1999. The ASEAN region has a population of 500 
million, a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres, a combined gross domestic product 
of almost US$ 700 billion and a total trade of about US$ 850 billion (Asian Development 
Bank, 2007). 
 
This chapter analyses fiscal decentralisation in China using the conceptual 
elements associated with the emphasis on fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of 
subnational governments (“SNGs”). Consideration is also given to the fiscal 
arrangements in the above-mentioned ASEAN countries. The motivation for this derives 
from the fact that these countries, together with Vietnam, are: (i) from the same region; 
(ii) all popular developing countries; and (iii) have relatively high economic growth rates  182
(at least in comparison with other countries at a similar level of development in different 
regions). The contribution of the chapter is the provision of a solid foundation for a 
comparison between the pattern of fiscal decentralisation in these countries and Vietnam. 
Some implications are drawn from the fiscal experience in these countries for the future 
progress of fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam. 
 
In this chapter, following this introduction, Section 8.2 discusses China’s long 
march towards fiscal decentralisation since 1949. In these discussions, the process 
towards fiscal decentralisation is examined from the core analytical perspective adopted 
in this thesis – that is, in terms of the distinction between fiscal autonomy and fiscal 
importance of SNGs in China, particularly since 1994 when a new tax sharing system 
was introduced. Also, the degree of fiscal decentralisation in China is estimated for the 
years when data are available. A general synthetic comparison of Vietnam and China is 
presented in Section 8.3 with the intention of identifying similarities and differences 
between these two countries’ fiscal systems and identifying potential lessons from 
China’s experience for fiscal decentralisation in Vietnam. The paths to fiscal 
decentralisation in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are also examined in Section 
8.4. Fiscal arrangements in these countries are considered here because they are members 
of the ASEAN and have some important similarities to Vietnam, in terms of fiscal 
arrangement (unitary countries), level of economic growth (all developing countries), 
population, and data availability. As such, these countries may, like China, provide 
insights which are useful to consider when reflecting on reform of fiscal decentralisation 
in Vietnam. The degrees of fiscal decentralisation across these five countries, for the 
years when data are available, are also measured in Section 8.5. The purpose of Sections 
8.4 and 8.5 is to identify potential lessons for Vietnam from the experience of these three 
ASEAN countries with fiscal decentralisation. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.6. 
 
8.2  China’s long march to fiscal decentralisation 
   
The Chinese Communist Party came into power after the civil war in 1949. With 
the expectation to make China become “a socialist, modernised and industrialised,  183
powerful country in the near future” (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of 
Australia, 1997, p.15), and with help from the Soviet Union, a series of Five-Year Plans 
were introduced. China is now a new superpower economy in the world with a 
continuous increase in annual growth rate and per capita GDP as presented in Figure 8.1. 
FIGURE 8.1
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   Source: Statistical Yearbooks of China, 1996 and 2004. 
 
China is the most populous country in the world with population of more than 1.3 
billion in 2007. The SNGs’ structure consists of 31 provinces, in which there are 4 cities 
under direct administrative control of the national government (Beijing, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, and Chongqing), 5 autonomous regions (Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, Tibet, 
Ningxia, and Xinjiang), and 22 other provinces. Consistent with convention in China 
studies, all provinces, cities, and autonomous regions are referred consistently to as 
“provinces” in this chapter. Government below the provincial level comprises three 
administrative levels: 479 prefectures, 1,894 counties and more than 60,000 townships 
(IMF, 2004, p.647). Due to the vast and populous areas, policy coordination among 
different levels of government, particularly from national to provincial levels, is very 
important and indispensable (Ma and Norregaard, 1998). As a result, some degree of 
fiscal decentralisation became an important tool for the national government to manage 
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8.2.1  Fiscal environments in China prior to 1979 
 
Prior to 1979, China’s achievements during the three decades since 1949 were 
significant. The achievements were partly contributed by the fiscal system which was 
centralised in nature (DFAT, 1997, p.14). The centralised nature of the fiscal system 
presented two important characteristics: (i) national budget control and (ii) an 
expenditure-oriented fiscal approach (Tong, 1997) which are discussed in turn. First, the 
national government controlled the budgets of all levels of government. All subnational 
budgets required approval from the national government, which also determined the 
structure and line-items in subnational budgets. Second, under the expenditure-oriented 
approach to fiscal affairs, revenue collected by SNGs was remitted to the national 
government. Then, the national government effectively arranged transfers among 
subnational regions in accordance with spending responsibilities assigned to them. For 
the period 1949 to 1979, for example, Shanghai had to remit up to 90 per cent of its 
locally-collected revenue to the national government whereas Tibet retained all 100 per 
cent of its locally-collected revenue (Tong, 1997). In aggregate, 85 per cent of all 
government revenue was collected by SNGs that were remitted to the national 
government, which, in turn, funded SNGs’ expenditure which accounted for 50 per cent 
of all public sector revenue.  
 
Two main concerns had been raised. First, SNGs had a diminished incentive to 
increase their revenue yield, as it was shared with the national government. Second, there 
was a concern about the capacity of the national government to plan all SNGs’ spending 
at the budget line-item level and to determine the structure of subnational budgets in a 
way that meets local needs. As such, by 1978, these perverse incentives brought China to 
the threshold of implementing reform in both the economic and fiscal fields.        
 
8.2.2  Reforms and fiscal decentralisation in China in 1979-1994 
 
In 1979, China initiated an extensive fiscal reform program, with the beginning of 
a process of fiscal decentralisation where the fiscal relationships among different levels  185
of government were altered. The ratio between subnational spending and total 
government spending averaged 50 per cent before and after the reform (i.e. the period 
from 1975 to 1979 and from 1980 to 1990) (Qian, 2002). However, under the 1979 
reform, SNGs were assigned the authority to decide the structure of their local spending, 
although within broad guidelines from the national government. Also, SNGs at provincial 
level were given the authority to determine the assignment of expenditure responsibility 
and sources of revenue with their lower tiers of SNGs at prefecture, county and township 
levels (Qian, 2002). These two changes reveal the fact that, in addition to a significant 
level of fiscal importance of SNGs which was represented by a ratio of subnational 
expenditure in total government spending, the relevance of provincial fiscal autonomy on 
spending programs had finally gained some official recognition. 
 
Between 1980 and 1984, the national government introduced further devolution 
of responsibility for revenue and expenditure to separate national and subnational fiscal 
decisions. This became known at the outset as the “eating in separate kitchens” 
arrangement (Qian, 2002). In this period, own-sourced local revenue; own-sourced 
national revenue; and revenue sharing were introduced. Regarding the revenue shared, 
the uniform rate was applied across regions with more than 80 per cent of revenue 
collected by SNGs being remitted to the national government. The national government 
did not have any representative offices to collect its own-sourced revenue, except for the 
case of import duties which were collected by the Custom offices (Ma, 1995). These 
arrangements had some important social implications. First, it restored some (albeit 
modest) incentive to SNGs to ensure compliance with tax laws, because SNGs retained a 
share of the revenue collected. Second, it resulted in more unequal regional distribution 
of public resources: wealthy provinces became relatively richer and the poor regions 
became relatively poorer.  
 
This problem was recognised by the national government and changes were 
introduced. Revenue sharing rates were no longer uniform across regions (Ma, 1995). In 
1985, the national government set different revenue sharing rates to different regions with 
reference to their respective budget conditions (surplus or deficit). The sharing rates were  186
more favourable to poor regions than to rich regions. For example, rich regions such as 
Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Liaoning were required to remit larger portions of their 
collected revenue to the national government. This adjustment solved imbalances among 
regions. As such, fiscal disparities among regions were reduced. However, fiscal 
incentives to rich provinces deteriorated relative to poor provinces. Rich regions were no 
longer enthusiastic about increasing tax revenue which was shared with the national 
government, in contrast to poor regions. This required further adjustment which is 
capable of compromising all possible regional and national interests. 
 
In 1988, a new fiscal contracting system was implemented. The significant 
changes in this new system involved the introduction of a set of six different sharing rates 
which were then applied to different regions. The contracted revenue sharing specified: 
(i) fixed yearly growth rate of revenue; (ii) fixed share in total revenue; (iii) fixed share in 
total revenue plus incremental fixed sharing rate; (iv) remittance with fixed amount 
growth rate; (v) fixed remittance; and (vi) fixed grants (Zhang and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2003). The new system provided a compromise balance in serving the interests of the 
national government, and poor regions as well as rich areas. However, this system still 
resulted in difficult problems emerging for both national and subnational governments 
because of many different types of contracts, with divergent rates adopted for different 
provinces, and the potential for inconsistency between some of the six specified sharing 
arrangements.  
 
By way of caveat, it should be noted that the preceding discussions have focused 
on the “budget” sector only – i.e. the fiscal arrangements for the general activities of 
government. It is also relevant that development in the “extra-budget” (or public trading 
enterprises) sector impacts on the relative fiscal positions of national and subnational 
governments. For the period from 1979 to 1994, there was a significant increase in extra-
budgetary fund generation and outlays, almost 100 per cent for revenue and 80 per cent 
for expenditure (Arora and Norregaard, 1997). However, these funds also open the 
possibility for SNGs to transfer some resources from budgetary (i.e. the amounts need to 
be shared with the national government) to extra-budgetary funds which can be used for  187
SNGs’ own use. For example, SNGs have the capability to provide tax concessions, tax 
holidays, and exemptions to enterprises operating in their region and still arrange for 
revenue raised from public utility charges, surcharges and fees to be returned to the 
“budget” as dividends or other payments from the extra-budgetary sector. Consequently, 
while reforms that commenced in 1979 were intended to improve efficiency of the fiscal 
system, by 1994, many substantial fiscal problems remained and needed to be corrected. 
 
8.2.3  1994 onwards 
 
Background for the 1994 reform 
Prior to 1994, the national government was concerned about its low level of fiscal 
autonomy over national fiscal matters on two grounds. First, total government revenue 
substantially decreased from 1978 and accounted for only 17 per cent Gross National 
Product (“GNP”) in 1993, whereas it was usually over 30 per cent GNP in capitalist 
economies. It should be recalled that the “eating in separate kitchens” policy had the 
effect of reducing the already modest incentive for provinces to ensure tax compliance, 
and that much of the decline in tax revenue vis-à-vis tax capacity was attributable to this 
policy. Second, and related to the first point, the national budget deficit started increasing 
from 0 per cent GNP in 1978 to 4.7 per cent GNP in 1992. Figure 8.2 presents the 
continuing decline of the ratio between total government revenue to GNP and an 
increased budget deficit in China for the period 1978-1992.  
 
Furthermore, the system of fiscal arrangements, for the period 1979-1993, 
provided limited benefits to the national government, while provinces enjoyed the 
benefits of extra-budgetary funds and greater incentives to ensure tax compliance. As a 
result, two main goals of the national government were: (1) to raise the ratio of total 
government revenue-to-GDP; and (2) to raise the ratio of national government-to-total 
public sector revenue (Wang, 1997), or the so-called “two ratios”. A new “tax sharing 
system” introduced in 1994 was the main mechanism for realising these two goals.  188
FIGURE 8.2 










































  Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1996. 
 
Evaluation of the 1994 reform 
In order to attain the goals of the two ratios, fundamental changes in 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers were made via the promulgation and implementation of 
China’s first “Budget Law”. Under this law, fiscal relations were based on the tax sharing 
system. The most significant aspects of this system were that: 
 
•  Revenue from enterprise profits was replaced by a new tax system including 
personal income tax, corporate income tax and value added tax. These three new 
shared taxes generated significant revenue for the national budget. Also, tax bases 
and tax rates were nationally determined. As such, the national government 
retained a significant share of revenue sharing. 
 
•  A national tax authority set up its representative offices in each province. Shared 
revenues and exclusively national taxes were collected by the national 
government. As a result, SNGs were no longer responsible for collecting these 
sources of revenue on behalf of the national government as they did prior to 1994.  
 
These two new measures helped the national government achieve its fiscal goals, 
but left SNGs in disadvantaged circumstances, which are discussed in the following 





increased substantially from 1993 to 1994, from 20 per cent to 55.7 per cent whereas the 
ratio of total revenue and GDP slightly decreased from 12.6 per cent in 1993 to 11.2 per 
cent in 1994. From 1994 onwards, while the ratio between total revenue and GDP 
continuously increased, the other ratio was largely unchanged at around 50 per cent.  
FIGURE 8.3












































     Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 2004. 
 
Fiscal importance of subnational governments in China after the 1994 reform 
   Fiscal importance of SNGs in China has been high since 1980 with SNGs’ outlays 
accounting for around 70 per cent of government expenditure. In short, as Table 8.1 
shows, while SNGs’ revenue share decreased sharply, subnational share of expenditure 
remained still high even after the 1994 reform.  
TABLE 8.1 
SUBNATIONAL SHARES OF REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE IN CHINA 
PRE- AND POST-1994 REFORM 
     1978 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Revenue (100 millions yuan) 
1,132 1,160  2,005 2,937 3,149 3,483 4,349 5,210 6,242 13,395 16,386 18,904 21,715
Of which: 
                   
  Subnational budget revenue 
956 875  1,235 1,945 2,211 2,504 3,391 2,312 2,986 6,406 7,803 8,515 9,850 
  Subnational share of total revenue (%) 
84.5  75.5  61.6 66.2 70.2 71.9 78.0 44.4  47.8 47.8  47.6  45.0  45.4 
Expenditure (100 millions yuan) 
1,122 1,229  2,824 3,084 3,387 3,742 4,642 5,793 6,824 15,887 18,903 22,053 24,650
Of which: 
                   
 Subnational  expenditure 
590 562  1,935 2,079 2,296 2,572 3,330 4,038 4,828 10,367 13,135 15,281 17,230
  Subnational share of total expenditure (%) 
52.6  45.7  68.5 67.4 67.8 68.7 71.7 69.7  70.8 65.3  69.5  69.3  69.9 














































Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1996. 
 
In addition, fiscal relations across different levels of government significantly 
changed after the 1994 reform. China has developed a complex system of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers based on four main types (Su and Zhao, 2004). First, 
the contact system operated prior to the 1994 reform and was still in use. Well-endowed 
SNGs remitted locally collected tax revenue, after retaining the assigned amount for 
expenditure responsibility, to the national government budget whereas less-endowed 
provinces received transfers from the national government. Of the 31 provinces, sixteen 
provinces were on the recipient side and fourteen provinces were on the remitting side 
(Wang, 2004). This effectively represents a partial fiscal equalisation system. Second, the 
tax rebating system (or revenue returned system) was developed with the goal of 
compensating less-endowed provinces so that they would not be worse off after the 
introduction of the 1994 reform. Third, the system of transitional transfer payments was 
introduced in 1995 to reduce fiscal disparities among different provinces in China. The 
value of this type of grants is determined with reference to regional domestic product, 
population, and regional wage differentials. Fourth, conditional grants were also 
introduced under two main forms of: (i) payments to SNGs for the adjustment of income 
distribution (i.e. funds earmarked for uses which increase the income levels of low and 
middle class) and (ii) payments to minority areas.  
 
In regards to expenditure arrangements, China does not have an explicit 
assignment of expenditure between the national government and SNGs and among tiers 
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of SNGs. This results in a lack of a formal assignment in terms of government 
expenditure (Martinez-Vazquez, 2001). The current budget law presents a very broad 
definition of the assignment of expenditure responsibility between the national 
government and SNGs and decisions on spending programs are still left at the discretion 
of the national government. As a result, the 1994 reform did not improve the fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs across their spending issues. A brief summary of these expenditure 
assignments is presented in Table 8.2. 
TABLE 8.2 
THE CURRENT ASSIGNMENT OF EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES IN CHINA 
1  The national government 
   Defence; foreign affairs; operations of the national government; operational expenses for 
cultural, educational, science, and public health undertaking at the national level. 
 Key capital construction; agriculture; subsidies; and social security; and etc. 
2 The  subnational  governments 
   Operations of SNGs; operational expenses for culture, education, science, and public health 
undertaking at the subnational level. 
 Subnational capital construction; agricultures; subsidies; and social security; and etc. 
Source: Smoke et al., (2006, p.93). 
 
The fiscal autonomy of subnational governments after the 1994 reform in China 
  The 1994 reform did not improve the autonomy of SNGs in generating their own-
sourced revenue. By setting up the representative office of the national tax authority in 
every province, the national government was able to collect all national taxes as well as 
shared taxes. After the 1994 reform, the national government collects main taxes with 
significant revenue – Import duties, Excises taxes, Value added tax. Subnational taxes 
include local company profits, stamp taxes, and a wide range of other minor taxes. Some 
taxes are shared between the national government and SNGs, including the Value added 
tax (except VAT on imports) with the ratio of 75:25 to national and subnational 
governments; and stamp taxes on stock exchange transactions with a ratio of 50:50 (Su 
and Zhao, 2004). The significant decrease in SNGs’ tax collection, which was not treated 
as subnational revenue, in China after the 1994 reform is clearly illustrated by Figure 8.5. 
As a result, in terms of SNGs’ share of revenue collection, for the period 1980 to 1993,  192
the average SNGs’ share was around 70 per cent total public sector revenue collections. 
This share fell to 44.4 per cent in 1994 and has remained at around that share since then.  










            (a)    Subnational revenue collection includes revenue collected by SNGs on behalf of the 
national government.   
Source: Statistical Yearbook of China, 1996.  
 
Significantly, the reform of 1994 did not achieve a notable increase in the fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs. Prior to 1994, SNGs had some autonomy over the “off-budget” tax 
treatment of public enterprises. However, that SNGs’ power was officially abolished after 
the 1994 reform (Bahl, 1995). This abolition weakened the fiscal autonomy of SNGs. 
Also, the centralisation of tax collection and administration contributed to a decreased 
level of fiscal autonomy of SNGs. SNGs were only allowed to collect personal income 
taxes and some smaller taxes without getting involved with the assessment, collection 
and audit of the value added tax (Bahl, 1995). 
 
In conclusion, prima facie, China appears to have recentralised its fiscal 
arrangements through the introduction of the new tax sharing system from 1994. The 
background for this view is that the SNGs’ collection in total revenue collection 
decreased sharply since 1994. In addition, since 1994, the national government changed 
the arrangement of shared revenue so that it could account for the lion’s share of national 
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8.2.4  China’s fiscal decentralisation index: 1995–2003. 
 
The fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation in China is measured, using the 
approach developed in Chapter 3, with its two component indices for the fiscal autonomy 
and fiscal importance of SNGs. To analyse the contribution of each component in the 
index, Table 8.3 presents SNGs’ fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance, and the FDI after 
the 1994 reform. From 1995 to 2003, even though the fluctuations are small, the general 
trend is that SNGs’ fiscal autonomy, fiscal importance and the FDI for China have 
slightly fallen.  
TABLE 8.3 
FISCAL DECENTRALISATION INDEX AND ITS COMPONENTS 
CHINA, 1995-2003 
Variables   1995  1996  1997  1998 1999 2000 2001  2002  2003
SNGs  2,986  3,747  4,424  4,984 5,595 6,406 7,803  8,515  9,850 Own-sourced revenue 
(100 mil. of yuan)  Total  6,242 7,408 8,651  9,876  11,444  13,395  16,386 18,904  21,715
SNGs  4,828 5,786 6,701  7,673  9,035  10,367  13,135 15,281  17,230 Expenditure 
(100 mil. of yuan)  Total  6,824 7,938 9,234 10,798  13,188  15,887  18,903 22,053  24,650
Fiscal autonomy (%)    31  32  33  32 31 31 30  28  29 
Fiscal importance (%)    71  73  73  71 69 65 69  69  70 
FDI (%)    47  49  49  48 46 45 45  44  45 
Source: Author's calculations and Statistical Yearbook of China (2004). 
 
Figure 8.6 shows the general trend of SNGs’ fiscal autonomy, fiscal importance, 
and the FDI in China for a longer period, from 1989 to 2003. By and large, the reduction 
in fiscal importance is offset by an increase in fiscal autonomy (although there has been a 
slight decline in fiscal autonomy from 1997). It is important to note that there was no 
radical change in the degree of fiscal decentralisation in China after the 1994 reform, 
even though there was a substantial reduction in subnational revenue collection from 
1994, as shown in Figure 8.5. This is because, prior to 1994, national revenues, which 
were collected by SNGs on the national behalf, are not treated as subnational revenues. 
As such, the clear conclusion is that, for the entire period, fiscal importance of SNGs in 
China has consistently contributed more to the overall level of fiscal decentralisation 
compared with the level of SNGs’ fiscal autonomy.   194
FIGURE 8.6
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Source: Author’s calculations, using data from Statistical Yearbooks of China 1996 and 2006. 
 
8.3  China and Vietnam – a fiscal comparison 
 
China and Vietnam are both developing countries in the Asia region with real per 
capita income in 2007 of around US$ 2,000 and US$ 750, respectively. Since 1990, both 
China and Vietnam have achieved high and stable rates of economic growth – among the 
highest rates in the world, around 10 per cent per year. Economic reform started in China 
in the late 1970s and 10 years later, in 1986, an extensive economic reform program was 
also launched in Vietnam. Both China and Vietnam have attempted to integrate 
themselves further with the world economy. Changes in fiscal decentralisation have been 
an element of broader economic reform in both countries. 
 
8.3.1  Similarities between China and Vietnam 
 
China and Vietnam share many similarities in the pattern of their economic 
growth. China commenced its extensive pro-market oriented economic reform in 1979 
while Vietnam marked its historic move towards market-oriented economic reform in 
1986. The basic similarities between China and Vietnam are presented in Table 8.4. 
Fiscal autonomy 
Fiscal importance 
Fiscal decentralisation index  195
TABLE 8.4 
COMMON PRACTICES FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH, 
CHINA AND VIETNAM 
Event   China   Vietnam 
War finished 
  1949 
The Communist Party came into power. 
 1975 
The nation was reunified. 
Five-Year Plans 
implemented 
  Four Five-Year Plans implemented in China 
prior to economic reforms: for 1953-1957; 
1961-1966; 1966-1970; and 1971-1975 with 
the emphasis on heavy industry. 
  Two Five-Year Plans from 1976-1980; 1981-
1985 with emphasis on heavy industry – 
Soviet model. 
Extensive economic reform 
programs  
 1979 
Adopted the market-oriented economy. 
 1986 
Adopted the market-oriented economy. 
Source: Arkadie and Mallon (2003) for Vietnam and DFAT (1997) for China. 
 
China and Vietnam have also shown a strong relationship both from the 
perspectives of politics and historical facts. The presence of Chinese in Vietnam for a 
thousand years in feudal regimes highlights the similarities of these two countries in 
terms of culture and society. Table 8.5 presents the similarities between China and 
Vietnam to which some implications from Chinese experience of fiscal decentralisation 
can be drawn for Vietnam. 
TABLE 8.5 
SIMILARITIES BETWEEN CHINA AND VIETNAM 
Similarity China Vietnam 
1. Political and government structure: 
  Leadership 
  Government structure 
 
  Local governments 
 
 
  Population. 
 
Chinese Communist Party. 
National People’s Congress; President 
and Prime Minister. 
Three levels: 31 provinces; more than 
1,800 counties and more than 60,000 
townships. 
Ranks number 1 in the world in 2007 
with more than 1.3 billion people. 
Vietnamese Communist Party. 
National Assembly; President and Prime 
Minister. 
Three levels: 64 provinces; more than 
600 districts and more than 10,000 
communes. 
Ranks number 13 in the world in 2007 
with more than 83 million. 
2. Economic aspects: 
  Before economic reform 
  Extensive economic reform 
  Significant fiscal changes. 
  
 
The centrally planned economy. 
1979 
In 1994 with the introduction of tax 
sharing system – the first Budget Law. 
 
The centrally planned economy. 
1986 
In 1997 with the introduction of the 
Budget Law. 
Source: Arkadie and Mallon (2003) for Vietnam and DFAT (1997) for China. 
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Clearly then, the similar history of these countries, in which communism was 
followed, reveals some common patterns in the process of economic growth in China and 
Vietnam. The issue of relevance is whether there are lessons for Vietnam from fiscal 
reform in China, especially with respect to the degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
 
8.3.2  Significant fiscal differences between China and Vietnam  
 
In regards to fiscal decentralisation, the main weakness in the assignment of 
expenditure responsibilities concerns lack of transparency and clarity in that both 
countries reveal overlapping spending responsibilities between national and subnational 
governments, particularly in relation to economic activities. The national government still 
accounts for a significant role, it is, however, clear that spending on the essential services 
is significant from the side of SNGs.  
 
TABLE 8.6 
CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS IN MAIN SPENDING RESPONSIBILITIES AMONG 
LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT IN CHINA AND VIETNAM 
Level China  Vietnam 
The national 
government 
  Defence; foreign affairs; operations of the 
national government. 
  Operational expenses for culture, education, 
science and public health undertaking at the 
national level. 
  Key capital construction. 
  Social securities. 
  Agriculture; subsidies; debts. 
  Defence, security and social orders. 
  Spending on economic activities, education, 
training, medicine, social and cultural events, 
informatics, science, technology and environment 
under national control. 
  Investment and support for state-owned 
enterprises; capital contributions for joint-stock, 
joint-venture companies in the field that required 
the presence of the nation. 
  Subsidies. 
Subnational 
governments 
  Operations of subnational governments. 
  Operational expenses for culture, education, 
science and public health undertaking at the 
subnational levels. 
  Local capital construction. 
  Social security. 
  Agriculture; subsidies. 
 
  Spending on economic activities, education, 
training, medicine, social and cultural events, 
science, technology and environment under 
provincial control. 
  Investments in infrastructure projects under 
provincial control. 
  Spending on social policies under provincial 
control. 
Source: Vietnam’s Budget Law 2004 for Vietnam and Qian (2002) for China. 
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Current arrangements on the allocation of sources of revenue 
In China and Vietnam, both levels of government (national and subnational) are 
allocated taxing power to a different extent. Table 8.7 presents tax allocation among 
levels of government in these two countries. Among some differences, taxes for shared 
revenue deserve special attention because the sharing rate of revenue is not 
predetermined in the case of Vietnam. This means that the national government has its 
own privilege to change the sharing ratio without notice to SNGs. This also explains why 
lobbying and negotiating may be possible for SNGs. On the other hand, for China, these 
sharing ratios are clearly predetermined for each type of shared tax. SNGs will have more 
incentive to increase tax revenue so that their portion will increase accordingly. 
TABLE 8.7 
CURRENT ALLOCATION OF SOURCES OF REVENUE 
CHINA AND VIETNAM 
Level   China  Vietnam 
The national 
government 
  Customs duties; VAT on imports; Excise tax. 
  Enterprise income tax (from rail transportation, state post, 
4 state-owned commercial banks, 3 state-owned policy 
banks, and offshore oil and gas). 
  Business tax from headquarters of banks, insurance 
corporations and ministry of railroad. 
  Profit remittances by all centrally owned enterprises. 
  Export rebates of enterprises engaged in foreign trade. 
  Custom duties; VAT on imports. 
  Excise tax from imports. 
  Enterprise income tax (from nationwide 
businesses such as airlines, rail, water, 







  Domestic VAT (75:25). 
  Stamp tax on security transaction (97:3). 
  Personal income tax (60:40). 
  Enterprise income tax, excluding from those for central 
budget (60:40). 
  Resources tax (offshore: 100 per cent for central budget 
and onshore: 100 per cent for local budget). 
  Domestic VAT. 
  Domestic excise tax. 
  Personal income tax. 
  Corporate income tax, excluding from those 
for national budget. 
  Natural resources tax. 
Subnational 
governments 
  Business tax, excluding those for shared revenue. 
  Property tax; Stamp tax; Contract tax. 
  All other minor taxes. 
  Agriculture tax. 
  Tax on land use right. 
  Slaughter tax; and some minor taxes. 
Source: Vietnam’s Budget Law 2004 for Vietnam and Qian (2002) for China. 
For the overall comment, Figure 8.7 presents: (i) both shares of subnational 
revenue and expenditure in total government revenue and expenditure in Vietnam are 
lower than those of China and (ii) subnational expenditure is always greater than 
subnational revenue in these two countries.   198
FIGURE 8.7
SUBNATIONAL REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE






1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Year
Proportion
  Note:  Subnational revenue includes own-sourced revenue and revenue from shared taxes. 
Source: China’s Statistical Yearbook 2006 for China and Ministry of Finance (2006) for Vietnam. 
                        
8.4  Fiscal decentralisation in selected ASEAN nations 
 
Some developing countries within the Association of South-East Asian Nations 
(“ASEAN”), such as Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand are also similar to Vietnam 
in that they are all developing countries in the same region of the world. As these 
countries have also confronted the issue of fiscal reforms they may have the potential to 
provide lessons for Vietnam.   
 
This section explores paths to fiscal decentralisation from three countries, all of 
which are foundation members of the ASEAN: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
The other founding members, Malaysia and Singapore, are not considered in this study 
because these countries are significantly different to Vietnam. In that regard, Singapore is 
an advanced country in terms of economic growth and Malaysia is a federal country. 
Also, Singapore and Malaysia have small populations (Singapore with 4.5 million and 
Malaysia with around 20 million) compared with Vietnam and the selected ASEAN 
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8.4.1  Contextual information  
 
Like Vietnam, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are all populous and 
developing countries in Asia, each with a low GDP per capita by international standards. 
Economic growth rates, per capita GDP, inflation and fiscal imbalance in these selected 
countries, together with Vietnam, are presented in Figure 8.8. Data are from the Asian 
Development Bank (2007). 
FIGURE 8.8 
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 2001–2006 
VIETNAM AND SELECTED ASEAN NATIONS 













































































































































































































Also, a current structure of these five countries is presented in Table 8.8. These 
countries share many similarities with Vietnam. Most importantly, all are: (i) unitary  200
countries with a low level of income; (ii) populous nations with around 230 million for 
Indonesia, 80 million for the Philippines, 65 million for Thailand, and 82 million for 
Vietnam; and (iii) have three levels of subnational governments. For benchmarking and 
comparative purposes, China and Vietnam have also been included in Table 8.8. 
TABLE 8.8 
THE STRUCTURE OF SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS: 




(Million)  The 1
st level  The 2
nd level  The 3
rd level 
1 Indonesia  230  32  autonomous 
provinces 




80  80 provinces  115 cities and 1,495 
municipalities 
41,945 barangays 
3  Thailand  65  76 provinces  75 changwads   6,745 districts and 
1,129 municipalities 
4  Vietnam  82  64 provinces  611 districts  10,602 communes 
5  China  1,300   31 provinces   479 cities and 1,894 
counties 
60,000 townships; and 
804,153 villages 
Source: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2004 (IMF). 
 
8.4.2  Fiscal importance of subnational governments 
 
The three ASEAN nations considered in this study plus China and Vietnam reveal 
a very insignificant ratio of subnational own-sourced revenue as a percentage of total 
SNGs’ revenue. Based on largely unpublished estimates obtained directly from Ministries 
of Finance, Taliercio (2005) and Mountfield and Wong (2005) estimate that Indonesia’s 
own-sourced revenue accounts for 15 per cent of total SNGs’ revenue – the highest level 
in all five countries in the sample. China and Vietnam have a very low level of own-
sourced revenue, around 5 per cent total SNGs’ revenue. Table 8.9 suggests that all five 
countries have been assigned very limited taxing powers to generate subnational revenue. 
In regards to expenditure responsibility, fiscal activities undertaken by SNGs are 
significant in these five countries, except for Thailand with the lowest ratio of SNGs’ 
expenditure in total government expenditure of 10 per cent. As such, it is clear that 
subnational expenditures in these five countries are funded by shared revenue with the 
national government and/or intergovernmental fiscal transfers from the national  201
government, not by their own-sourced revenue – the revenue generated with their own 
revenue-raising powers assigned from the national government. 
TABLE 8.9 
ESTIMATES OF OWN-SOURCED REVENUE
12 AND EXPENDITURE  









(% of total 
expenditure) 
Indonesia (2002)  15.4  Multilevel administration with tax sharing  32 
The Philippines 
(2002) 
13.1  Self-administration by each level of government  26 
Thailand (2002)  > 5  Multilevel administration with tax sharing  10 
Vietnam (2003)  < 5  Central administration with tax sharing  48 
China (2003)  < 5  Multilevel administration with tax sharing  69 
Source: Derived from Taliercio (2005, p.108 and 121) and Mountfield and Wong (2005, p.86). 
 
8.4.3  Fiscal autonomy of subnational governments 
 
Taxing-power assignment to SNGs is central to the issue of fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs. In view of this, it is appropriate to consider the specific assignment of taxation 
categories in selected ASEAN countries under consideration. For benchmarking and 
comparative purpose, the cases of Vietnam and China will again be considered.  
 
The initial review revealed that property taxes are not applied by SNGs across all 
of the five countries. Vietnam, for example, does not have a property tax in the modern 
sense of the term because there is no formal market for land transaction and land is 
                                                 
12 The subnational own-sourced revenues reported in this table reflect estimates provided directly from: the 
Ministries of Finance for Indonesia and the Philippines; the World Bank’s staff estimates for China and 
Vietnam; and the internal World Bank’s draft document for Thailand. These data are not publicly 
available and are different from data derived from the publicly available Government Finance Statistics 
yearbooks published by the IMF, which are used for the fiscal decentralisation index reported in Section 
8.4.5 of this chapter (except for Vietnam, in which case detailed disaggregated data were required from 
the Ministry of Finance, Vietnam). In brief, the IMF data assign revenue collected from shared taxes to 
levels of government in accordance with the share of revenue collections they retain (even when the 
authority to set the base, rate and revenue share resides with the national government). Moreover, the 
data are not published at a disaggregated level, so revenue from shared taxes cannot be netted off SNGs’ 
own-sourced revenue. This data limitation was acknowledged in Section 3.4.2 of Chapter 3.    202
collectively owned. However, Vietnam does levy taxes on land rights (i.e. the right to use 
land) and housing, land rent and transfers of land use right. However, fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs over these taxes is limited since the national government sets all tax bases and tax 
rates. In Thailand, land taxes account for only 5 per cent of SNGs’ revenue but the 
national government controls all property tax rates and bases (Taliercio, 2005, p.112). On 
the other hand, China has many taxes on property which are levied on the same tax base 
which are not market-valued through direct transactions, such as tax on real estate 
holding (i.e. unrealised asset value), tax on the use of urban land, and land value added 
tax (Statistical Yearbook of China, 2006, p.290). However, to a certain extent, SNGs in 
China have more autonomy over these property taxes compared to SNGs in Vietnam 
because they are able to set these tax rates within the band determined by the national 
government. Large cities may set relatively higher property tax rates. Indonesia provides 
very limited SNGs’ autonomy over property tax because the national government 
controls policy and administration and shares 80 per cent of the revenue from this tax. In 
the Philippines, the property tax is a significant source of revenue for SNGs which can set 
tax bases and tax rates within the limit set by the national government. For example, the 
property tax rates are set at 2 per cent for provinces and 3 per cent on the market value 
for cities and municipalities. Specifically, the property tax brings more than 35 per cent 
total subnational revenue in the Philippines (Taliercio, 2005, p.112). 
 
The second important tax for SNGs’ revenue is business tax. Table 8.10 reveals 
that, among 5 countries, only China and the Philippines administer formal business tax 
systems. Business tax in the Philippines is imposed on the value of gross sales and it 
accounts for almost 30 per cent total subnational revenue while, in China, this type of tax 
is levied on transportation, communication and construction which are not subject to the 
value added tax. Revenue from the business tax accounts for around 22 per cent total 
subnational revenue in China (Taliercio, 2005, p.114). Most importantly, SNGs in these 
two countries have full autonomy to set the rates for this tax. This assignment is really an 





THE ASSIGNMENT OF SUBNATIONAL OWN-SOURCED REVENUE 
Tax/Charges Vietnam  China  Indonesia The  Philippines  Thailand 
User charges  Yes 




fees on SNGs’ services 




SNGs tax land and 
housing rent, and 
transfer of land use 
rights, but have no 
autonomy to set tax 
bases and tax rates. 
Yes 
On urban land use 
taxes and SNGs have 
autonomy to set tax 




But revenue is 
shared between 




Rates set by 
SNGs to a limit 
and SNGs have 





government sets tax 
rates and bases for 
taxes on land 
development and 




But the national 
government and SNGs 
share revenue from 
corporate income tax. 
Yes 
On gross receipts and 
other surcharges (e.g. 




limited to a few 
sectors. 
Yes 




Though limited to a 
small number of 
sector-specific 
business type taxes. 
Excise taxes  No  No 
But taxes on vehicle 
and vessel use. 
Yes 
On motor vehicles, 





But revenue is shared 
between the national 
government and SNGs. 
No 
This tax is assigned to 
SNGs who have no 
autonomy to set rates 
and bases. 
No 
But revenue is 
shared and SNGs 
have no autonomy 
on tax policy. 
Yes 
Though the tax is 
in the form of a 
poll tax. 
No 
Payroll taxes  No  No  No  No  Yes 
Though base of 
national personal 





But the national 
government and SNGs 
share revenue from 
value added tax. 
No 
But the national 
government and SNGs 
share revenue from 
value added tax. 
No No No 
But revenue is 
shared with   
national government 
Source: Adapted from Taliercio (2005, p.113). 
 
The last significant generator of own-sourced revenue for SNGs is users’ fees and 
charges. Users’ fees and charges are widely available as in Table 8.10. The Philippines  204
has more than 33 different types of users’ charges such as civil registration, electrical 
light and power fees, hospital fees, building permit fees (Taliercio, 2005, p.115). In 
Thailand, SNGs levy users’ charges on garbage collection, public utilities, and medical 
services. In Indonesia, significant revenue comes from charges for health services which 
account for around 33 per cent of local revenue and 46 per cent of provincial revenue 
(Taliercio, 2005, p.116). Vietnam’s SNGs also levy various types of service charges, 
from health services to garbage collection, public utilities, road toll and many others. 
 
There are significant similarities between these five countries in terms of the 
assignment of responsibilities for services provision by SNGs. A summary of key 
assignments is presented in Table 8.11. There are three significant issues regarding the 
assignment of expenditure responsibility across the national government and SNGs: (i) 
unclear assignment of expenditure responsibility; (ii) non-matching of fiscal resources to 
the assigned expenditure responsibility to SNGs from the national government; and (iii) 
non-matching of SNGs’ authority over their spending decisions to their responsibilities.  
TABLE 8.11 
THE ASSIGNMENT OF KEY EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES  
ACROSS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT 
Area Vietnam  China  Indonesia The  Philippines  Thailand 
Defence  N N  N N  N 
Foreign  affairs  N N  N N  N 
Environment and natural resources  N, P, L  N, P, L  …  …  … 
Unemployment insurance  …  L  …  …  … 
Industry and agriculture  N, P, L  N, P, L  L  …  … 
Education  N, P, L  L  L  N, P, L  L 
Health  N, P, L  L  L  N, P, L  L 
Social welfare  N, P, L  L  L  P, L  … 
Police N  L  L  P,  L  L 
Highway  N, P, L  N, P, L  N, P, L  …  L 
Notes: N = National; P = Provincial; L = Local government; and (…) = not identified. 
Source: Adapted from Mountfield and Wong (2005, p.88). 
 
It is clear from Table 8.11 that overlapping assignment of responsibility for 
provision of services between the national government and SNGs is most pronounced in 
Vietnam, significant in China and the Philippines, and insignificant in Indonesia and  205
Thailand. National and subnational governments deal concurrently with most of the 
spending items. The overlapping of responsibilities is usually an indicator of “unclear” 
expenditure assignment. For Indonesia, Decentralisation Law No. 20 of 1999 allocated all 
“residual” areas of spending, which are not under the national government’s scope, to 
SNGs. This is as a result of the so-called “Big Bang” approach in fiscal decentralisation 
in this country introduced in 1999 (Mountfield and Wong, 2005, p.90). It is also the case 
in Thailand. In contrast, China and Vietnam reveal significant overlapping in the 
assignment of responsibility for service provision. The national governments in these two 
countries attempt to assign a greater extent of spending responsibility to SNGs but as they 
were unwilling to assign matching levels of authority over SNGs’ tax bases, such 
attempts met with limited success. In addition, the national governments set the norms for 
SNGs to follow in their expenditure assignment. However, the experience of all five 
countries reveals a general similarity that is truly fundamental to the issue of fiscal 
autonomy - responsibilities of SNGs for service provision far exceeds SNGs’ own-
sourced revenue to finance the services provided. 
 
  In short, all five countries face the issue of non-matching of fiscal resources to the 
assigned expenditure responsibilities of SNGs. Fiscal resources in this discussion are 
SNGs’ own-sourced revenue and do not include shared revenue to SNGs from the 
national government when the national government controls the tax rates and bases and 
the share of the revenue yield allocated to SNGs. In terms of SNGs’ fiscal autonomy, it is 
clear that SNGs in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand are more autonomous in 
comparison with Vietnam and China. SNGs in China and Vietnam rely heavily on 
revenue shared with the national government as well as the intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers from the national government in comparison with SNGs in Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand in the analysis. 
 
Finally, there is a significant mismatch between authority and responsibility of 
SNGs over their spending programs. In these five countries, SNGs as the service 
providers are assigned responsibility to provide public services to their region without the 
ability to decide the level at which services are provided or manage their own expenditure  206
programs. In Vietnam, the provincial government must strictly follow the expenditure 
norms for particular functions set by the national government through the national budget 
process. For example, the provincial government must spend 15 per cent of their budget 
on education by 2000, 18 per cent by 2005 and 20 per cent by 2010. Similarly, in 
Indonesia, the national government sets an expenditure ceiling for each region (or 
province) (Mountfield and Wong, 2005, p.99). 
 
8.4.4  Constitutional aspects of fiscal autonomy 
 
Of the five unitary countries considered in this analysis, only the Philippines and 
Thailand provide some legal guarantees for the revenue-raising powers of SNGs in their 
Constitution. However, even in these two countries, the constitutional guarantee of 




•  Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues 
and to levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress 
may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges 
shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.  
•  Section 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national 
taxes which shall be automatically released to them.  




… For the purpose of the continual development of decentralisation to a higher level, there shall be the 
law determining plans and the process of decentralisation, the substance of which shall at least 
provide for the following matters. 
1.  The delineation of powers and duties in the management of public services between the State and 
a local government organisation and among local government organisations themselves. 
2.  The allocation of taxes and duties between the State and a local government organisation, having 
regard to burdens of the State vis-à-vis the local government organisation and those among local 
government organisations themselves.  207
3.  The setting up of a committee to perform the duties in (1) and (2) consisting, in an equal 
number, of representatives of relevant government agencies, representatives of local government 
organisations and qualified persons possessing the qualifications as provided by law. 
4.  In the case where the delineation of powers and duties and the allocation of taxes and duties 
under (1) and (2) have been made for any local government organisations, the committee under 
(3) shall review them every five years as from the date of the delineation of powers and duties or 
the date of the allocation of taxes and duties, as the case may be, in order to consider the 
suitability of the delineation of powers and duties and the allocation of taxes and duties previously 
made, having particular regard to the promotion of decentralisation. 
The proceeding under paragraph four shall be effective when the approval of the Council of 
Ministers has been obtained and the National Assembly has been notified thereof.  
Source: Chapter 9, the 1997 Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand. 
 
In the case of the Philippines, the national Congress may set guidelines and 
limitations on the devolution of taxing powers. In the case of Thailand, the question of 
assigning taxing powers is placed in the hands of a Committee which is constituted by the 
decision of the National Assembly. Nevertheless, the committee does comprise 
representatives of local governments. Also, no such regulations on fiscal powers of SNGs 
are found in the Constitutions of the other countries in the sample: Indonesia, Vietnam 
and China. As such, revenue-raising powers and expenditure responsibilities of SNGs lie 
in the national budget laws as in the case of Vietnam and China. This reveals a fragile 
nature of fiscal arrangements between the national government and SNGs in these 
countries. 
 
8.4.5  Numerical evidence 
 
Based on the measures of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs, and the 
fundamental index of fiscal decentralisation developed in Chapter 3, it is possible to 
consider the degree of fiscal decentralisation for Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand
13. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, fiscal arrangements in Indonesia, the 
                                                 
13 For consistency of an international comparison in terms of fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of 
subnational governments, as well as the degree of fiscal decentralisation across years, we use fiscal data 
from the Government Finance Statistics yearbooks published by the IMF – the only systematic source of 
time series fiscal data.  208
Philippines, and Thailand can only be explored in different timeframes: 1975-1993, 
1978-1992, and 1975-2001, respectively. The results are shown in Figure 8.9. 
 
FIGURE 8.9 
FISCAL AUTONOMY, FISCAL IMPORTANCE, AND 
THE FUNDAMENTAL INDEX OF FISCAL DECENTRALISATION 



































































































































































































































Fiscal autonomy:  
FDI:  
Legend:  209
The Philippines and Thailand have fiscally decentralised their fiscal powers and 
responsibilities to SNGs. Interestingly, fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs in 
Indonesia are of similar orders of magnitude. However, in the Philippines and Thailand, 
the fiscal autonomy of SNGs is much greater than fiscal importance. It is likely to be 
linked to the fact that powers to generate revenue for SNGs are regulated in their 
respective Constitution whereas it is not the case in Indonesia.  
 
The fiscal importance of SNGs in Indonesia
14, the Philippines, and Thailand is 
much lower than for Vietnam but fiscal autonomy of SNGs in these three selected 
ASEAN countries is significantly higher than that of Vietnam. The lessons of this for 
fiscal reform in Vietnam will be considered in Chapter 9.  
 
8.5  Concluding remarks 
 
The chapter overviewed fiscal decentralisation in China since its fiscal reform in 
1979 and compared the arrangements for fiscal decentralisation between China and 
Vietnam. Both countries were found to have pursued the objective of fiscal 
decentralisation by increasing the expenditure activities of SNGs (i.e. increase the fiscal 
importance of SNGs) but without a corresponding increase in the fiscal autonomy of 
SNGs over their revenue-raising activities. 
 
  Fiscal arrangements in other selected ASEAN nations, namely Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand were also considered with reference to the fiscal autonomy and 
fiscal importance of SNGs. To date, reform has focused more on fiscal importance than 
fiscal autonomy of SNGs. It was found that the constitutional dimension to reform in the 
Philippines and Thailand was linked to the realisation of a greater degree of fiscal 
autonomy for SNGs. This suggests a possible means by which reform in Vietnam and 
other populous developing nations may increase the degree of fiscal decentralisation. 
                                                 
14 The investigation for Indonesia and the Philippines is quite dated as available data discontinued at 1993 
for Indonesia and 1992 for the Philippines. This will limit the analysis of the contributions of these two 
countries to Vietnam’s fiscal decentralisation in Chapter 9.    210
CHAPTER 9 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In his classic study on fiscally decentralised systems, Oates (1972) demonstrated 
that “it will always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to 
provide the Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the 
central government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all 
jurisdictions” (Oates, 1972, p.35). While this finding has since been qualified, static 
economic efficiency benefits arising from decentralised arrangements of fiscal relations 
between the national and subnational governments remain a key factor in favour of fiscal 
decentralisation. However, no conclusive view on dynamic efficiency implications of 
fiscal decentralisation has been established yet, as the empirical results of investigations 
into the relationship between economic growth and fiscal decentralisation are mixed
15.  
 
To date though, measurement of fiscal decentralisation has been largely arbitrary 
and failed to reflect considerations that are important in the theory of fiscal 
decentralisation. For example, fiscal decentralisation has been simply defined as: (i) the 
national share of total government expenditure by subnational governments (SNGs) 
(Davoodi and Zou, 1998) or (ii) the share of SNGs’ revenue in consolidated government 
revenue (Thieben, 2003). The degree of fiscal decentralisation for Australia and Germany 
are 62 per cent and 71 per cent using expenditure shares; and 45 per cent and 43 per cent 
using the revenue measure
16. However, most importantly, these measures are both 
detached from the theory of fiscal decentralisation in that neither of these measures 
accounts for the degree of fiscal autonomy that SNGs have over their fiscal activities.  
 
This study makes three contributions to the existing literature on the economics of 
fiscal decentralisation. First, it develops a new index of fiscal decentralisation in which 
“fiscal autonomy” plays a significant role. This is then applied to a wide range of 
                                                 
15   Immi (2005), Thieben (2003), and Yilmaz (1998), to name a few, find a positive relationship between 
fiscal decentralisation and economic growth, while Davoodi and Zoo (1998) and Zhang and Zoo 
(1998) find a negative relationship.  
16    Extract from Table 3.3 of Chapter 3.  211
countries, ranging from federal to unitary nations, and from developed to developing 
economies. Second, it provides the basis for incorporating the influences of subnational 
“fiscal inequality” into future development of the index of fiscal decentralisation. Third, 
it applies the conceptual foundation associated with the indices developed in this study to 
developing countries, for the purpose of general policy guidelines for the reform of fiscal 
decentralisation arrangements in Vietnam in particular, and developing countries more 
generally. This chapter overviews the seven major chapters of the thesis; discusses the 
significance of the study; and highlights some important lessons for Vietnam’s fiscal 
decentralisation in the future. 
 
9.1  A summary of the thesis 
 
Chapter 1 discusses the current issues associated with fiscal federalism and the 
economics of fiscal decentralisation that motivate this study. It also presents summarised 
numerical examples which illustrate many of the ideas pertaining to measuring fiscal 
decentralisation. 
  
Chapter 2 discusses the main aspects of the economics of fiscal decentralisation. 
Subsequent to the pioneering work of Oates, two generations of theory were found in the 
fiscal decentralisation literature. The first generation theory of fiscal decentralisation is 
found to be well established and includes two main streams: (i) those that draw on 
Tiebout’s impure local public good concept, and integrate it with the Musgravian 
framework on three different branches or categories of public finance and (ii) those that 
draw on Tiebout’s notion of interjurisdictional mobility and link it with forces that limit 
the size of the public sector. The second generation theory of fiscal decentralisation also 
began to emerge by drawing on notions from the theory of the firms; the economics of 
information; principal-agent problem; and the theory of the contract. Much of the work of 
the second generation theory concerns the issue of balance between the degree of fiscal 
centralisation and fiscal decentralisation. However, the presence of the second generation 
theory of fiscal decentralisation does not remove the main findings of the first generation  212
theory; rather, it complements these findings by providing new perspective on a trade-off 
issue in fiscal decentralisation.  
 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 make significant and important contributions to the thesis 
as these chapters are devoted to the development of measures of fiscal decentralisation 
that draw on the economics of fiscal decentralisation. Chapter 3 analyses and develops a 
new and theoretically sound foundation for the development of the fiscal decentralisation 
index (“FDI”). The index developed in Chapter 3 mainly concerns first-order issues of 
fiscal decentralisation, which emphasises fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of SNGs, 
and is suitable for international comparisons. Chapter 4 provides a further enhancement 
to the index by extending the FDI to account for two further issues in fiscal 
decentralisation – the intergovernmental fiscal transfers and subnational borrowings 
which form the second-order issues. The other unique contribution of Chapter 4 is that 
the first-ever index of fiscal decentralisation, developed by an Italian economist Scotto in 
1950, has been revised and compared to the newly developed indices in this study to 
highlight the relative strengths and weaknesses of each approach.   
 
Chapter 5 provides the foundation that, in future, will provide the basis for an 
even more refined measure of fiscal decentralisation by considering the distributional 
aspects of revenue and expenditure across subnational units (including both regional 
(state) and local levels). This was done for two reasons that became evident in the indices 
developed in Chapters 3 and 4: (i) revenue and expenditure of government within each 
subnational region are implicitly assumed to be equal (either in absolute, or in per capita 
terms); and (ii) the hierarchical structure of the implicit fiscal constitution is ignored (i.e. 
subnational governments are not differentiated by type – the state government level is not 
distinguished from the local government level). Using information theory developed by 
Theil (1967), an analytical framework for investigating fiscal inequality was developed 
that captured differences in the distribution of revenue and expenditure across 
subnational governments, including both across regions (states or provinces) and local 
councils in Chapter 5. Fiscal inequality of SNGs includes two components: (i) the 
between-region inequality and (ii) within-level of government inequality. In addition,  213
SNGs’ fiscal inequality has been measured in two distinct ways. First, a geographical-
region approach was adopted in which subnational regions were geographically allocated 
into different groups. Second, a governmental-hierarchy approach was adopted in which 
different levels of government were considered (i.e. state level versus local level).  
 
Chapter 6 involves the specific application of the concept of fiscal inequality to 
Australia and Denmark – the two countries for which adequate data were available to 
apply this approach. In Australia, subnational government units include 7 state 
governments and 700 local governments whereas subnational government units in 
Denmark consist of 14 counties and 273 local municipalities. Using the framework of 
fiscal inequality developed in Chapter 5, at the aggregate level, total fiscal inequality was 
found to be greater in Australia compared with Denmark. This meant that the dispersion 
of revenue and expenditure shares was different in these two countries. The results 
revealed that there may be a positive bias in the fundamental index (the FDI in Chapter 3) 
and the enhanced index of fiscal decentralisation (the eFDI in Chapter 4) in favour of 
unitary countries, such as Denmark, China, and Vietnam, and against federal nations such 
as Australia and Switzerland. As such, the degree of fiscal decentralisation for Australia 
(or federal countries more generally) and Denmark (or unitary countries more generally) 
will, in future studies, need to be adjusted for the impact of subnational fiscal inequality.  
 
Chapters 7 and 8 are devoted to the historical analysis of the current state of fiscal 
decentralisation in Vietnam (in Chapter 7) since 1990 and fiscal decentralisation in China 
since 1979; and in selected ASEAN nations (in Chapter 8). Prima facie, Vietnam appears 
to be moderately decentralised because its subnational revenue and expenditure account 
for around one-third of total government revenue and expenditure. However, it was 
shown that it is a partial and misleading view because it does not account for the fiscal 
autonomy of SNGs in Vietnam. Subnational governments’ revenue in Vietnam mainly 
comes from taxes shared with the national government, where tax bases and rates are all 
centrally determined. Also, decisions on expenditure programs at subnational regions are 
not at their discretion. As a result, the analysis reveals the centralised nature of fiscal  214
authority in Vietnam, as SNGs have still not been assigned significant revenue-raising 
powers and responsibilities for public service delivery.  
 
9.2  Implications for the study 
 
This study has investigated the economics of measuring fiscal decentralisation. It 
was, in some respects, a response to the inconsistent and partial measures of a degree of 
fiscal decentralisation presently adopted in current empirical studies. The fiscal 
decentralisation indices developed have been progressed in stages: a fundamental FDI 
(Chapter 3) was developed that focused on fiscal autonomy and fiscal importance of 
SNGs; an enhanced FDI (Chapter 4) was developed which incorporated the influences of 
intergovernmental transfers and debts on SNGs’ fiscal autonomy. The issue of 
subnational fiscal inequality (Chapters 5 and 6) was also introduced to the economics of 
fiscal decentralisation, with a view to this influence being incorporated within future 
versions of the indices.  
 
Our estimates of the degree of fiscal decentralisation should be particularly useful 
for international organisations, such as the IMF and World Bank, interested in promoting 
decentralised fiscal reform; and national and subnational governments that advocate 
fiscal reforms related to the assignment of fiscal powers, unconditional transfers and 
others. Companies and residents may also be interested in the background work on 
subnational fiscal inequality aspects of revenue and expenditure across subnational units. 
Perhaps, most importantly, academics and economists will find the study to be useful as it 
provides a comprehensive analysis of the economics of fiscal decentralisation. It should 
also encourage further research on the relevance of fiscal inequality to further issues of 
fiscal decentralisation.   
 
9.3  Some lessons for Vietnam 
 
Subnational governments in Vietnam are clearly, as evidenced and discussed in 
Chapter 7, in a very weak position because: (i) the national government sets tax bases and  215
tax rates; (ii) tax administration is nationally centralised; and (iii) there is a heavy 
interference on subnational spending programs from the national government. That is, 
under current arrangements, the fiscal autonomy of SNGs in Vietnam is very limited, and 
reform should be aimed at redressing this. A mechanism for devolving more 
responsibility from the national to subnational governments would be highly desirable. 
 
This thesis has revealed that fiscal autonomy of subnational governments in 
Vietnam is at the lowest level in comparison to similar ASEAN countries (Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand) and to China. As the national government of Vietnam attempts 
to reform fiscal decentralisation have, to date, shown no signs of devolving responsibility 
to SNGs, it appears that only the provision of some degree of basic “constitutional” 
authority for subnational government responsibility over fiscal matters will enhance an 
enduring increase in fiscal decentralisation through improved fiscal autonomy. Perhaps 
the constitutional provision for the Philippines and Thailand, as discussed in Chapter 8, 
may prove instructive in that regard. For Vietnam, and other similar developing 
countries, the key is for SNGs to become accountable to the public for their fiscal 
decisions, but this should be achieved without decreasing the capabilities of individual 
subnational governments to respond innovatively to public demands and to compete with 
other SNGs. Consequently, any constitutional provision to make SNGs autonomous 
should not be so prescriptive as to prevent innovative subnational behaviour emerging, 
either in regard to methods of own-sourced revenue raising or to methods of providing 
public services. 
 
Other factors that could be complementary to constitutional change in affecting an 
increase in fiscal decentralisation include: (i) a relatively greater emphasis by SNGs on 
fees and charges for services compared to “general taxation” (as the former would 
generally be at the discretion of SNGs, while the latter would generally be largely 
directed by the national government); (ii) reduced emphasis on “shared” taxes; and (iii) a 
(constitutionally mandated) reduction in the portion of fiscal transfers from the national 
government to SNGs made in the form of conditional transfers (i.e. tied grants).  
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9.4  A final word on fiscal autonomy and fiscal inequality 
 
The curious lack of recognition of the fiscal autonomy of SNGs revealed in this 
thesis has two dimensions, a “constitutional” dimension (i.e. a tendency within 
developing nations to decentralise finances to SNGs without a corresponding degree of 
responsibility and autonomy); and an “applied measured” dimension (i.e. a tendency to 
measure fiscal decentralisation in applied academic studies without regard to the role of 
SNGs’ fiscal autonomy). The challenge ahead is to reintroduce fiscal autonomy as a 
central feature of both “constitutional” and “applied measured” issues in fiscal 
decentralisation. Ideally, this should be done in a manner that also accounts for the 
influence of fiscal inequality.  217
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